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I.  INTRODUCTION
The problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying
from within what you are trying to defend from without.1
The development, production, and potential deployment of chemi-
cal weapons have become the greatest threat of mass destruction in
the post-Cold War world.2 Recent United States intelligence reports
estimate that there are upwards of twenty-five nations that either
currently possess stockpiles of chemical weapons or are in the proc-
ess of developing them.3 Moreover, these sources specifically name
China,4 India,5 Iran,6 Iraq,7 Libya,8 North Korea,9 Pakistan,10 and
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1. PEGGY ANDERSON, GREAT QUOTES FROM GREAT LEADERS 131 (Celebrating Excel-
lence Publ’g 1990) (quoting Dwight D. Eisenhower).
2. See Burrus M. Carnahan, Chemical Arms Control, Trade Secrets, and the Consti-
tution: Facing the Unresolved Issues, 25 INT’L LAW. 167, 168 (1991). Carnahan bases this
view on the widely publicized use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. Carnahan
also cites Iraq’s threats to use chemical weapons against Israel and Libya’s reported con-
struction of a chemical weapons production facility as evidence of the increased risk posed
by chemical weapons in the post-Cold War era. See id. at 168.
The technologies and nuclear matter necessary for the creation of a nuclear weapon are
closely guarded by the nations who possess successful nuclear programs. However, the in-
formation and substances required for the development and production of a chemical
weapon are readily available worldwide on the Internet. See Randal Ashley, Nunn and
Lugar Tell the Hard Truth About Dangers We Face, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 5, 1995, at
G6. Chemical weapons do not require advanced technology. Instead, chemical weapons
can be made in private locations with chemicals that have common non-military purposes.
See id.; infra notes 115-19 and accompanying text; see also Stuart Auerbach, 19 Nations
Back U.S. Plan for Chemical Arms Curbs , WASH. POST, May 31, 1991, at A1.
3. The list of nations suspected or known to currently possess chemical weapons in-
cludes Angola, Bosnia, China, Croatia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. See Treaty
Isn’t Perfect, But It Does Mean a Safer World, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1997, at A10
[hereinafter Treaty Isn’t Perfect].
4. See China Calls For Early Implementation of Weapons Convention, Xinhua News
Agency, July 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
5. See Treaty Isn’t Perfect, supra note 3.
6. Iran signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, or the Chemical
Weapons Convention (Treaty), in 1993, but failed to ratify it. As Dr. Gordon C. Oehler, Di-
rector of the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency, noted:
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Syria11 as likely chemical weapons proliferators.12 As far as U.S. in-
telligence reports are concerned, each of these countries poses a sub-
stantial threat for the dissemination or use of chemical weapons.
                                                                                                                   
[Iran] continues to upgrade and expand its chemical weapons production infra-
structure and chemical munitions arsenal. Iran is spending large sums of
money on long-term capital improvements to its chemical weapons program as
part of this expansion, which tells us that Tehran fully intends to maintain a
chemical weapons capability well into the foreseeable future.
Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destriction, Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 104th Cong. 217 (1996) (Statement of
Dr. Gordon C. Oehler). Oehler further stated that:
Tehran is continuing its drive . . . to acquire increasingly toxic nerve agents
and soon should have a production capability for these agents. It also is devel-
oping a production capability for precursor chemicals it needs to support
chemical agent production, and within several years may become virtually in-
dependent of imported raw materials.
Id.
7. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War in
the 1980s. See Carnahan, supra note 2, at 168. Saddam Hussein also used chemical weap-
ons against Khurdish refugees amassed inside the Iraqi border. See id. U.S. intelligence
sources learned that Hussein intended to conduct a chemical weapons attack on United
States soldiers during the Gulf War. Captured Iraqi documents and newly declassified
U.S. intelligence reports revealed that Hussein actually gave the order for chemical weap-
ons to be used against Allied Forces once these troops crossed into Iraqi territory. The re-
ports indicated that Iraq’s chemical weapons were deployed and their commanders were
given discretion to use the weapons. See Keith Timmerman, The Iraq Papers: Saddam’s
Weapons Revealed, NEW REPUB., Jan. 29, 1996, at 12; see also Arthur Spiegelman, Iraq
Ordered Chemical Warfare in Gulf War, Reuters World Service, Jan. 17, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
8. In 1985, U.S. satellites discovered a major construction project near Rabta, a re-
mote desert town in Libya. The U.S. suspected that the Libyans intended to build the
largest chemical weapons plant in the developing world. Such fears escalated when packs
of wild dogs near the facility suddenly and mysteriously died. Concerns about the Rabta
project resurfaced last year when Libya purchased from two German companies the tech-
nology to produce mass quantities of poison gas and the equipment needed to build a
chemical weapons production facility deep inside a mountain fortress. See Libyan Report
Denies Plans for Massive Chemical Weapons Plant, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Feb. 26,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (based on statements made by the
Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, John Deutch); William C. Rempel &
Robin Wright, Dead Dogs, Surveillance, Vigilance, Luck Expose Libya Plant, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1989, at A1; see also THOMAS C. WIEGELE, THE CLANDESTINE BUILDING OF LIBYA’S
CHEMICAL WEAPONS FACTORY 21, 32-33 (1992); Mary Williams Walsh, German Linked to
Libyan Arms Deal, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996, at A4.
9. See Karen Lowe, Threat of Future Chemical Weapons Attack Is Growing, Experts
Say, Agence France Presse, Mar. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.
10. See id.
11. Syria purchased chemical weapons from the Soviet Union prior to 1991. See Knut
Royce, Mideast Chemical Arms Deal: Russia Denies Soviet Official’s Accusation, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 2, 1995, at A17. Vil Mirzayanov, Counter-Intelligence Chief of Russia and the former
Soviet Union’s chemical warfare research department, told the Senate Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations that such weapons were shipped to the Mideast sometime
prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. See id.
12. See Race Is on for Chemical Weapons, CHI. TRIB., Feb 19, 1996, at A1 (quoting
John Holum, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency); see also Lowe, su-
pra note 9 (citing U.S. intelligence sources that suspect, inter alia, China, North Korea,
Pakistan, and India).
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In addition, the possibility that terrorist organizations will ac-
quire chemical weapons continues to increase.13 The March 1995 in-
tentional release of deadly Sarin gas in a Japanese subway well-
illustrates this point.14 The knowledge and substances necessary to
construct an even more lethal device are easily accessible, thus
heightening the fear that such a scenario could be played out in
other parts of the world—including in the United States.15
Furthermore, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has created a
fear that large quantities of chemical weapons will escape Russian
control.16 High-ranking Russian officials admit that prior to its col-
lapse in 1991, leaders of the former Soviet Union sold chemical
weapons to Middle East countries, including Syria.17 The potential
supply of these weapons has not dried up. As economic hardship
continues to mount in the new Russian republics, a logical fear exists
that some of this stockpile may fall into unauthorized hands.18 Rus-
sian soldiers charged with the duty of guarding insufficiently se-
cured stores of chemicals might be easily bribed by would-be terror-
ists.19 The result could be the unhindered spread of mass quantities
of chemical weapons to irresponsible leaders and radical terrorist or-
ganizations.20
On January 13, 1993, in an effort to defend against the growing
threat of chemical weapons described above, an international com-
                                                                                                                   
13. The difficulty with preventing such an attack is that individual terrorist organi-
zations, unlike nations, cannot be readily deterred from using chemical weapons. Addi-
tionally, the very nature of the radical views espoused by terrorist organizations makes it
all the more likely that extremist groups will eventually decide to use chemical weapons
once they obtain them. See Randal Ashley, Q & A on the News, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Mar. 28, 1996, at A14; see also Dick Hogan, Conference Is Warned of Chemical Weapons
Risk, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 7, 1996, at Home News 2 (quoting Commandant Peter Daly of the
Army Ordinance Corp). Daly concluded: “For the foreseeable future, the chemical weapon
will continue, like the Sword of Damocles, to hang over the head of civilised society.” Id.
14. Adequately distributed, one-third of an ounce of Sarin can produce up to 5000
casualties. See Ashley, supra note 2 (quoting James A. Genovese, U.S. Army Chemical &
Biological Defense Command).
15. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar feared that thousands of Americans at-
tending the Olympic games in the Georgiadome, like the Japanese commuters in the sub-
way, could have been killed just as easily from a cult’s Sarin gas attack. See id.; see also
Lowe, supra note 9 (discussing the likelihood that the United States will become a target
for chemical weapon attacks now that a loose network of terrorist organizations can easily
acquire and assemble these devices).
16. Estimates of the size of the Russian stockpile of chemical agents range between
40,000 and 50,000 tons. See Choke Hold, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 79; see also Lowe,
supra note 9.
17. See Royce, supra note 11.
18. See Choke Hold, supra note 16, at 79.
19. See id. Inspectors visiting Russian chemical weapons storage sites observed un-
guarded doors, single padlocks, and a lack of alarms. Additionally, they noted the possibil-
ity that impoverished Russian soldiers might accept small amounts of cash in return for
access to the stockpiles. See id.
20. See id.
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munity of more than 120 nations signed the Convention on the Pro-
hibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, or the “Chemical
Weapons Convention” (Treaty).21 Since that time, forty additional
countries have signed the Treaty.22 On April 24, 1997, after a fervent
political battle and heated legislative debate, the United States Sen-
ate ratified the Treaty, making the United States an original mem-
ber of the Treaty.23
It is the contention of these authors that, in ratifying the Treaty
and effectuating its verification requirements, the United States will
jeopardize the protection of individual rights upon which our democ-
racy was founded, and which the Treaty was designed to protect.
Part II of this Article interprets the text of both the Treaty and
the domestic legislation that would implement the Treaty in the
United States (Implementation Act),24 in light of the individual con-
stitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Part II also
discusses the scope of the Treaty’s verification mechanisms, and
specifically concentrates on the on-site and challenge inspections.
The Treaty’s verification regime, unlike other arms control trea-
ties, allows foreign inspectors to search private businesses and resi-
dences in the United States.25 For this reason, Part III focuses on the
applicability of Fourth Amendment legal analysis to the Treaty and
its domestic Implementation Act.26 Part III also considers each of the
potential legal justifications upon which a court or magistrate might
rely when deciding whether to grant a search warrant to government
officials seeking to perform a challenge inspection search. Of course,
before international authorities will be permitted to conduct a chal-
lenge inspection, they will be required to obtain a valid search war-
rant through domestic officials at the Department of Justice. Unfor-
tunately, Department of Justice officials will likely be unable to sat-
                                                                                                                   
21. Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21 (1993) [hereinafter TREATY]; see also
David G. Gray, Note, “Then the Dogs Died”: The Fourth Amendment and Verification of
the Chemicals Weapons Convention , 94 COLUM. L. REV. 567, 568 (1994).
22. See Serguei Batsanov, CWC Is Not Industry’s Foe; Involvement by Business Will
Ensure Benefits, DEFENSE NEWS, Jan. 29-Feb. 4, 1996, at 20 (as of January 1996, 46 of the
Treaty’s 160 signatories had ratified the Treaty).
23. See Alison Mitchell, Senate Approves Pact on Chemical Weapons After Lott Opens
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1997, at A1.
24. See The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1997, S. 610,
105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Implementation Act]. At the time of publication, there
were several versions of proposed legislation to implement the Treaty. This Article dis-
cusses and cites to the first version of the Implementation Act, which was officially intro-
duced in the Senate on April 17, 1997. See id.
25. See David A. Koplow, The Shadow and Substance of Law: How the United States
Constitution Will Affect the Implementation of the Treaty, in SHADOWS AND SUBSTANCE:
THE TREATY 155, 155 (Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson eds., 1993).
26. See Implementation Act, supra note 24.
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isfy the necessary constitutional requirements of the Fourth
Amendment before such warrants are issued.27
Part IV addresses the U.S. government’s proposed solution for en-
suring that it does not unintentionally abrogate its Treaty obliga-
tions by failing to fulfill its obligation to facilitate challenge inspec-
tions. Notably, the language of the domestic Implementation Act
strips the judiciary of its power to issue injunctive relief to private
citizens seeking to prevent unconstitutional challenge inspections.
This provision is designed to ensure that a judge cannot impede the
United States’ verification requirements by issuing an injunction
that enjoins officials from conducting inspections without the requi-
site level of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. This legislative
safeguard, however, undermines the protections of judicial enforce-
ment of the Fourth Amendment28 and therefore violates the Consti-
tution.
This Article concludes that the Treaty, while founded upon the
noble goal of ridding the world of these hideous weapons of mass de-
struction, is constitutionally infirm. The challenge inspections upon
which the Treaty’s effectiveness is based are made impractical by the
necessity of their procedural compliance within the strictures of the
Fourth Amendment.
II.  ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY AND DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION ACT
A.  Foundations of the Treaty
Since January 13, 1993, 160 nations have signed the Treaty.29 The
Treaty became effective 180 days after the sixty-fifth nation achieved
domestic ratification, on April 29, 1997.30 By that date, seventy-six
ratifying nations, including the United States, had become original
State Party members.31
                                                                                                                   
27. See infra Part III.
28. The Fourth Amendment in its entirety states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
29. See Batsanov, supra note 22, at 20.
30. See TREATY, supra note 21, art. XXI, ¶ 1, at 323 (outlining the requirements un-
der which the Treaty would become effective); Stanley Meisler, Senate OKs Pact to Ban
Chemical Warfare, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1997, at A1.
31. See Meisler, supra note 30, at A8; see also Briefing by Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, Fed. News Serv., Sept. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. Nations who ratify the Treaty after it becomes effective must wait 30 days
before they can become a State Party member. See Defense Department Briefing, Fed.
News Serv., Apr. 8, 1997 (Remarks by John Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
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The United States became an original State Party member when
the Senate voted to ratify the Treaty on April 24, 1997.32 However,
U.S. ratification did not come easily. Despite leading the interna-
tional effort to sign the Treaty in 1993, the United States nearly
missed the deadline to join the Treaty as an original State Party
member. Initially, the U.S. ratification process stalled as a result of
several tangentially related political disputes. Despite President
Clinton’s attempts to acquire Senate ratification in the fall of 1996,
Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, refused to release the Treaty from his committee.33
Helms rejected Clinton administration pleas to pass the Treaty to
the Senate floor for a ratification vote until other Republican priori-
ties, such as the reformation of several supposedly antiquated for-
eign policy agencies, were completed.34
President Clinton and Senator Helms resolved their dispute by
agreeing to a compromise consolidation plan.35 Helms allowed the
Treaty to be considered and debated by the Committee, which even-
tually voted to recommend ratification. He then sent the Treaty to
the Senate for a full vote.36 However, ratification encountered a sec-
ond delay on the Senate floor. The original Senate debate occurred in
September 1996, in the midst of the presidential campaign between
President Clinton and Senator Robert Dole.37 Fearing it lacked the
                                                                                                                   
armament Agency (ACDA), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter
Defense Department Briefing].
32. See Mitchell, supra note 23.
33. See Jim Lobe, Arms Pact First Test of Clinton Internationalist Credo, Int’l Press
Serv., Feb. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
34. See id. Specifically, Helms planned to consolidate the Agency for International
Development (AID), the U.S. Information Service, and the ACDA into the State Depart-
ment. See John Carlin, A Horse Would Do a Better Job, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 16, 1997, at
World 11. President Clinton vowed to veto Helms’ proposal. See Charles William Maynes,
The Big Chill at State as Helms Battles the White House, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at M2
(noting that this dispute “brought the entire foreign-policy process to a halt”). Helms re-
acted by refusing to permit any legislation, including the Treaty, to pass from his foreign
affairs committee. See id.; Barbara Crossette, U.S. Politics Delays Treaty on Poison Gas,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, at A9.
35. See Senate OKs Start II Treaty, UPI, Jan. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Wires File. Helms agreed to hold hearings on the Treaty by April 30, 1997, or to
send the Treaty directly to the Senate floor for consideration. In return, President Clinton
agreed to submit a State Department consolidation plan saving $1.7 billion over five
years. By agreement, if the Administration fails to offer this plan, the three agencies tar-
geted by Helms will be eliminated. See id.
36. See Letter of Transmittal from President Clinton to U.S. Senate (Nov. 23, 1993),
in TREATY, supra note 21, III-VI; see also Pat Griffith, Chemical Arms Treaty Embattled,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 13, 1997, at A8.
37. See Barry Kellman & Edward A. Tanzman, Chemical Treaty Deserve [sic] Ratifi-
cation: No One’s Constitutional Rights Are Going to be Violated by the Treaty, BULL. OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Jan. 11, 1997, at 15.
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number of needed votes to ensure ratification, the Clinton admini-
stration withdrew the Treaty from Senate consideration.38
After the election, President Clinton made ratification of the
Treaty one of his most important foreign policy goals.39 After another
agreement with Senator Helms, the Treaty again passed from the
Committee to the Senate floor, this time a week before the deadline
to ratify the Treaty as an original member.40 After several days of
political maneuvering and the application of intense political pres-
sure from the White House, the Treaty finally received the necessary
two-thirds majority of votes.41
1.  Textual Mandates of the Treaty
The purpose of the Treaty is not only to prevent the use of chemi-
cal weapons, but also to eliminate their production and stockpiling.42
The Treaty attempts to achieve these goals through several means.
First, the Treaty requires a State Party member to destroy existing
stockpiles of chemical weapons within ten years after the Convention
becomes effective.43 Second, the Treaty has two different built-in
verification mechanisms to guard against the prohibited use,
stockpiling, or production of chemical weapons: routine inspections
and challenge inspections.44
                                                                                                                   
38. See id.; Griffith, supra note 36; see also Tom Rhodes, Setback for Treaty, TIMES
(London), Sept. 14, 1996, at 14.
39. See Capital Hill Hearing With Defense Department Personnel, Fed. News Serv.,
Mar. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, Newslibrary, Curnws File (reporting a Capital Hill
hearing with Defense Department personnel, namely John Holum, Director of the U.S.
ACDA). Senator Richard Lugar (Repub., Ind.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, introduced the Treaty in the Senate on January 21, 1997. See Lugar Intro-
duces Resolution Calling for Ratification of CWC, Armed Forces Newswire Serv., Jan. 22,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
40. This compromise not only involved President Clinton’s concessions to some of
Helms’ demands, but also threats by Democrats to thwart all other Senate business un-
less the Treaty received immediate consideration. See Frank Gaffney Jr., Chemical Weap-
ons Moment of Truth, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at A16; see also Late Approval Granted
for Chemical Accord, JANE’S DEFENCE WEEKLY, Apr. 23, 1997, at 8.
41. The turning point of the Senate vote came when President Clinton persuaded
new Republican Senate Leader Trent Lott to support the Treaty. See Mitchell, supra note
23; see also Jerry Gray, Resolving Treaty Issue, Lott Seems to Cement Party Leadership,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1997, at A6. Lott’s support then brought along other Republican
votes, which guaranteed Treaty ratification. See Mitchell, supra note 23.
42. See TREATY, supra note 21, Preamble, at 279.
43. See id. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A), ¶ 17(a)-(c), at 365-
66 (explaining the differences between the three categories of chemical weapons and the
timeframe by which each category is to be destroyed).
44. See id. § D, at 370-76. This Article focuses on the constitutionality of challenge
inspections only. Routine inspections primarily involve government-owned production and
stockpiling facilities or privately owned businesses that are so closely tied to the govern-
ment that they do not have the same expectations of privacy associated with those private
businesses or residences covered by challenge inspections. See New York v. Burger, 482
U.S. 691, 700 (1987). As discussed below, the scope of challenge inspections permits
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The Treaty divides actual and potential chemical weapons into
three distinct schedules that list the toxic chemicals and their pre-
cursor chemical agents.45 Schedule One is a list reserved for chemi-
cals already converted to weapons status and which have a high po-
tential for use in activities prohibited by the Treaty.46 Schedule Two
includes chemicals that possess such “lethal or incapacitating toxic-
ity . . . that would enable [them] to be used as . . . chemical
weapon[s],”47 and are “not produced in large commercial quantities
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.”48 Schedule Three
contains highly lethal toxins that may be produced in large com-
mercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under the Treaty.49
For each facility containing a chemical covered under Schedules
One, Two, or Three, the Treaty establishes a comprehensive routine
verification regime. This routine regime includes such requirements
as data monitoring and collection, self-reporting by businesses and
state-operated facilities, and regular on-site inspections by an inter-
national enforcement directorate.50
More importantly, the Treaty also establishes a system of chal-
lenge inspections. The challenge inspections allow signatory State
Parties to make immediate on-site inspections of any facility within
the jurisdiction of another State Party member.51 These challenge in-
spections are used to resolve disputes concerning questions of possi-
ble noncompliance.52 To allow this verification system to function,
the Treaty establishes a clear procedure to which State Parties must
adhere.53
2.  Procedure for Challenge Inspections
Any State Party member may request a challenge inspection of a
facility inside the territory of another State Party member. The first
step in initiating a challenge inspection is for a State Party member
to submit a request for an inspection to the director-general and ex-
                                                                                                                   
Treaty inspectors to target almost any private facility or residence, even those without a
direct connection to the production or stockpiling of chemical weapons. See infra Part
III.C.2.
45. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Chemicals, at 325-31.
46. See id. ¶ 1, at 326.
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 2(d), at 327.
49. See id. ¶ 3, at 327.
50. See id. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI, § E, at 407-08 (listing
the verification regime for Schedule One chemicals); id. Part VII, § B, at 412-15 (listing
the verification regime for Schedule Two chemicals); id. Part VIII, § B, at 419-21 (listing
the verification regime for Schedule Three chemicals).
51. See id. art. IX, ¶ 8, at 311. The Treaty permits treaty officials to inspect private
businesses and residences throughout the United States. See infra Part III.C.2.
52. See TREATY, supra note 21, art. IX, ¶¶ 8-25, at 311-13.
53. See id. Annex on Implementation and Verification, at 332-444.
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ecutive counsel of the Convention.54 To prevent frivolous requests or
unfounded challenge inspections, a State Party member’s request
must fall within the scope of Treaty guidelines by providing the di-
rector-general and executive counsel with all relevant information
suggesting noncompliance.55 Specifically, a State Party member’s in-
spection request must contain at least the following information:
(a) The State Party member to be inspected and, if applicable, the
Host State;
(b) The point of entry to be used;
(c) The size and type of the inspection site;
(d) The concern regarding possible non-compliance with this Con-
vention including a specification of the relevant provisions of this
Convention about which the concern has arisen, and of the nature
and circumstances of the possible non-compliance as well as all
appropriate information on the basis of which the concern has
arisen; and
(e) The name of the observer of the requesting State Party mem-
ber.56
The director-general must acknowledge receipt of the request for
a challenge inspection within one hour of submission of the above in-
formation.57 The director-general must then notify the State Party
member to be inspected, and supply that State Party member with
the same information listed above, not less than twelve hours before
the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.58
Once the request for a challenge inspection is officially submitted,
the Executive Counsel has only twelve hours to reject the request.59
For the executive counsel to reject the request, three-quarters of the
majority must vote against permitting the inspection.60 If the three-
quarters majority is not met, then the request for a challenge in-
spection is considered approved.
Within twenty-four hours of arrival at the point of entry, the in-
ternational inspection team must be transported to the point of in-
spection by the Host State Party member.61 Not later than twelve
hours after arriving at the inspection site, the inspection team must
begin collecting data at the perimeter and exit points of the facility.62
                                                                                                                   
54. See id. Part X, ¶ 4, at 428-29.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id. ¶ 5, at 429.
58. See id. ¶ 6, at 429.
59. See id. art. IX, ¶ 17, at 312.
60. See id.
61. See id. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, ¶ 15(b), at 431.
62. See id. ¶ 23, at 432.
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Within 108 hours of arrival, the Host State Party member must
provide the inspection team with internal access to the facility.63
An observer from the State Party member that requested the
challenge inspection is permitted to be at the site and to make rec-
ommendations to the inspection team.64 It must also be informed as
to the conduct and findings of the inspection by the inspection
team.65 Finally, the challenge inspection shall not last longer than
eighty-four hours, unless by agreement of the Host State Party
member.66
The Host State Party member has one significant measure to
limit the scope of the search of the challenge inspection. The lan-
guage of the Treaty guarantees that the Host State Party member
may take into account any domestic constitutional obligations. The
Treaty states in relevant part:
[T]he inspected State Party member shall be under the obliga-
tion to allow the greatest degree of access taking into account any
constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary
rights or searches and seizures. The inspected State Party member
has the right under managed access to take such measures as are
necessary to protect national security. The provisions in this para-
graph may not be invoked by the inspected State Party member to
conceal evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohib-
ited under this Convention.67
This provision is commonly referred to as the Treaty’s
“constitutional savings provision.”68 Supporters of the Treaty claim
that the Host State Party member can theoretically use this provi-
sion to refuse access to a challenge inspection site if the inspection
compromises national security or violates the Host State Party
member’s constitution.69 However, such an interpretation of the con-
stitutional savings provision is flawed for several reasons. First, it
would be politically disastrous for a State Party member to invoke
this provision. The Treaty intends for challenge inspections to serve
                                                                                                                   
63. See id. ¶ 39, at 435.
64. See id. art. IX, ¶ 12, at 311; id. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part
X, ¶¶ 53-56, at 437-38.
65. See id. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, ¶ 55, at 437.
66. See id. ¶ 57, at 438.
67. Id. ¶ 41, at 435. The Treaty later discusses managed access in the following
terms:
The inspection team shall take into consideration suggested modifications of
the inspection plan and proposals which may be made by the inspected State
Party member, at whatever stage of the inspection including the pre-
inspection briefing, to ensure that sensitive equipment, information or areas,
not related to chemical weapons, are protected.
Id. ¶ 46, at 436.
68. Gray, supra note 21, at 595.
69. See id. at 545-46.
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as an immediate and effective means of verifying another State
Party member’s compliance.70 The purpose of a challenge inspection
is to expose a violation of Treaty restrictions or to alleviate the rea-
sonable fear of the State Party member requesting the inspection.71
Designed to instill confidence in the Treaty’s verification mechanism,
challenge inspections provide a State Party member broad and in-
trusive discretion to investigate suspected violations. Such discretion
is required because of the ease with which other State Party mem-
bers can easily produce, transport, and hide chemical weapons.
If the Host State Party member invokes the constitutional sav-
ings provision to deny access, neither of these goals is achieved. It is
doubtful that verbal assurances of compliance could alleviate the re-
questing State Party member’s fears. Thus, the effectiveness of the
verification mechanism rests upon quick and virtually unrestricted
access to inspections of suspect facilities. Without challenge inspec-
tions, State Party members would have no confidence in the Treaty’s
verification regime. The State Party member requesting the inspec-
tion, and the international community, would assume that a Host
State Party member refusing to allow inspections was attempting to
hide a Treaty violation.72
Furthermore, the integrity and effectiveness of the Treaty’s verifi-
cation mechanisms demand that the entire Treaty be reciprocal. For
example, assume the United States requested a challenge inspection
of an Iranian facility, but Iran denied access to protect the rights of
the facility’s owner. The United States could reasonably assume that
the Iranians were merely covering up a treaty violation.73 However,
if the verification mechanisms are to function effectively, the United
States must be as open to challenge inspections as it expects other
nations to be.74 The United States should not invoke the constitu-
tional savings provision to protect the rights of private businesses
and citizens without expecting to create perceptions of noncompli-
ance with Treaty prohibitions on chemical weapons production and
stockpiling.75
The Treaty also states that before a Host State Party member
may deny the inspectors access to an area, the member is obligated
                                                                                                                   
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See David A. Koplow, Arms Control Inspection: Constitutional Restrictions on
Treaty Verification in the United States, 63 N.Y.U.L. REV. 229, 355-56 (1988) (stating that
if a State Party member uses warrant requirements to justify denying access to a chal-
lenge inspection site, other State Party members will perceive a deliberate cover-up).
73. See Gray, supra note 21, at 578 (arguing that the reciprocal right to conduct
challenge inspections in other countries prevents the United States from relying on the
constitutional savings clause to avoid challenge inspections on its own soil).
74. See id.
75. See id. at 576, 578.
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to use “alternative means to clarify” why a limited-access area is not
related to Treaty compliance obligations and, therefore, not subject
to search.76 However, it is hard to imagine an alternative means of
demonstrating compliance or non-relation when the Host State
Party member denies a team of international inspectors full access to
the facility. The only proof of compliance would be the Host State
Party member’s own verbal assurances. If these were sufficient, the
other State Party member would not have requested a challenge in-
spection in the first place.77
Reciprocity and the efficacious functioning of the verification re-
gime demand that each Host State Party member resolve its own
constitutional requirements without denying access to the inspection
team. Therefore, the Host State parties have an obligation to place
verification over national security concerns and must make every
reasonable effort to demonstrate good faith when denying inspection
requests.78
B.  Textual Mandates of the Implementation Act
Like most arms control treaties, the Treaty is not self-executing—
it requires that each State Party member form its own National
                                                                                                                   
76. TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, ¶ 42,
at 435. Paragraph 42 states: “If the inspected State Party provides less than full access to
places, activities, or information, it shall be under the obligation to make every reasonable
effort to provide alternative means to clarify the possible non-compliance concern that
generated the challenge inspection.” Id.
77. Some American supporters of the Treaty have suggested that the United States
National Authority could use the constitutional savings provision when it cannot obtain a
search warrant. See Gray, supra note 21, at 590-91. This is impossible for the reasons
stated above. In addition, relying on the savings provision would force the United States
to categorically deny any challenge inspection to a privately owned residence or non-
chemical business. Such a denial would destroy the verification regime because the State
Party member would presume a Treaty violation. Once confidence in the verification re-
gime is lost, the Treaty becomes worthless.
78. By using a Treaty provision distinct from the constitutional savings provision,
private and state-owned businesses may take reasonable measures to prevent the disclo-
sure of confidential business information during the search. These include removing or
covering sensitive equipment; restricting sample analysis to the presence or absence of
chemicals listed in Schedules One, Two, or Three; and in exceptional cases, giving only
individual inspectors access to certain areas of the inspection site. See TREATY, supra note
21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, ¶ 48, at 436. In such instances, the
Host State Party member is responsible for demonstrating that the portions of the in-
spection site to which the inspection team is granted only limited access are not related to
possible noncompliance with the Treaty. See id. ¶ 49, at 436.
However, this clause does not include a total denial of access to the inspectors. Instead,
it is intended solely as a means to limit access to confidential business information where
the owner or business has made a reasonable attempt to show that it is a business secret
that is unrelated to any possible non-compliance with the Treaty. See Gray, supra note 21,
at 595-96.
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Authority to oversee compliance with Treaty mandates.79 It is the re-
sponsibility of each National Authority to act as liaison between that
State Party member’s government and the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).80 Each State Party mem-
ber must also design its National Authority to ensure the smooth
application of the Treaty’s verification mechanisms.81 Thus, the Im-
plementation Act was designed to fulfill the United States’ obligation
to create a National Authority to ensure adhesion to the Treaty’s
constructs.82
Title I of the Implementation Act establishes the United States
National Authority.83 Section 101 requires the President to create
such a National Authority, but vests the President with the proper
discretion to decide which arm of the executive branch will oversee
the Treaty’s verification.84
Title IV of the Implementation Act governs the National Author-
ity’s procedure for handling inspections to be conducted in the
United States.85 Subsection 401(h) mandates that the National
Authority assist inspected facilities in interactions with the inspec-
tion team.86 Section 402 gives the President the power to decide
which federal department to appoint to handle compliance with cer-
tain inspections.87
Title IV also imposes criminal and civil penalties on those who
impede or hinder the National Authority’s ability to help conduct the
inspections permitted by the Treaty’s verification regime.88 Section
403 makes it “unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to permit en-
try or inspection, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede an in-
spection as required by this Act or the Treaty.”89 Section 404 details
the criminal and civil penalties for violations of section 403.90 For ex-
                                                                                                                   
79. See Koplow, supra note 72, at 288 n.363 (“A self-executing Treaty is one that re-
quires no congressional action in order to become domestic law.”) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111 (1986)).
Congress introduced the Implementation Act to authorize the establishment of a United
States National Authority. The Implementation Act also authorizes the National Author-
ity to enforce the Treaty requirements in the United States.
80. See TREATY, supra note 21, art. VII, ¶ 4, at 297. The Treaty states: “In order to
fulfill its obligations under this Convention, each State Party member shall designate or
establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with
the Organization and other State Parties.” Id.
81. See id. art. VII, at 297; Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 401(h).
82. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 101(a).
83. See id. § 101.
84. See id.
85. See id. § 401.
86. See id. § 401(h).
87. See id. § 402.
88. See id. § 404.
89. Id. § 403.
90. See id. § 404.
1998]             CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 583
ample, subsection 404(a) provides for civil fines of up to $50,000 for
refusing to provide an inspection team access to conduct a challenge
inspection.91
Furthermore, the Implementation Act recognizes the need for the
National Authority to provide timely access for challenge inspections
at almost any facility in the United States. This includes challenge
inspections of facilities where private individuals or businesses
might refuse access by invoking their Fourth Amendment rights.92
The purpose of the Implementation Act is to provide the National
Authority with the ability and the authority to ensure that a chal-
lenge inspection occurs within the mandates of the Treaty and the
Constitution.
Section 406 dictates the legal procedural framework for challenge
inspections.93 Section 406(a)(1) requires the Lead Agency to seek the
consent of the owner of the premises prior to the inspection.94 Either
before or after seeking such consent, the Lead Agency may seek a
search warrant from an official authorized to issue search war-
rants.95 The official will conduct the search warrant hearing ex parte
unless the Lead Agency decides otherwise.96 The Lead Agency shall
provide the information supplied by the Technical Secretariat con-
cerning the basis for the selection of the site and the type of inspec-
tion requested in seeking the warrant.97 In the case of challenge in-
spections, the Lead Agency will also provide the official with any ap-
propriate evidence or reasons given to the Technical Secretariat by
the State Party member requesting the inspection, or any other rele-
vant information.98
Section 406(a)(2) specifically states:
The official authorized to issue search warrants shall promptly is-
sue a warrant authorizing the requested inspection upon an affi-
davit submitted by the Lead Agency showing that—
(A) the Treaty is in force for the United States;
(B) the plant site, plant, or other facility or location sought to be
inspected is subject to the specific type of inspection requested un-
der the Treaty;
                                                                                                                   
91. See id. § 404(a). Normally, one might expect that a single $50,000 fine would be
sufficient regardless of the duration of the refusal to permit the search. However, this
section states that “each day such a violation of section 403 continues shall constitute a
separate violation of section 403.” Id. § 404(1)(c). The purpose of this latter provision is to
place additional pressure on those who refuse access.
92. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (guaranteeing “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures”).
93. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406.
94. See id. § 406(a)(1).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.; see also infra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text.
98. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(a)(1).
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(C) the procedures established under the Treaty and this Act for
initiating an inspection have been complied with; and
(D) the Lead Agency will ensure that the inspection is conducted in
a reasonable manner and will not exceed the scope or duration set
forth in or authorized by the Treaty or this Act.99
Section 406(a)(3) requires that the warrant specify the type of in-
spection and the location of the inspection, including any specific
items or documents and the identity of the inspectors.100 The Lead
Agency may use a subpoena to require the attendance and testimony
of witnesses or to compel the production of documents, papers, or re-
ports.101
Finally, Section 406(c) demands that no court issue an injunction
or other order that would limit the ability of the Treaty officials, the
United States National Authority, or the Lead Agency to facilitate
an inspection authorized by the Treaty.102
Private individuals may not challenge the validity of the search
warrant prior to the inspection, despite the fact that the Lead
Agency is not required to meet the standard of probable cause re-
quired for a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment.103 The
Implementation Act does not require that the Lead Agency provide
any evidence to support the justification of the search beyond its de-
scriptions about the time, place, and manner of the search.
1.  Verification
The Treaty, like the array of international arms control treaties
that precede it, can only be as effective as the verification mecha-
nism established to enforce it.104 When a country decreases the size
of its chemical weapons stockpile and ceases production of these
weapons, it necessarily relinquishes a strategic military advan-
tage.105 Each country that abides by the Treaty must have confidence
                                                                                                                   
99. Id. § 406(a)(2). While the Implementation Act requires “reasonable” searches,
nothing in the language of this provision mandates that the search not exceed the time
and manner restrictions required by the Treaty. Nothing in section 406(a)(2)(D) demands
that the “reasonableness” of the search include evidence to support the probable cause re-
quirement established by the Supreme Court in its totality of the circumstances test. See
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (establishing the totality of the circumstances test);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
100. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(a)(3).
101. See id. § 406(b).
102. See id. § 406(c); see also infra Part III.
103. However, a court could still deny the Lead Agency’s request for a warrant be-
cause it is facially deficient under the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir.1982)
(quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)).
104.  See Michael Krepon, Open Skies and Multilateral Verification, in VERIFICATION:
THE KEY TO ARMS CONTROL IN THE 1990S 106 (John G. Tower et al. eds., 1992).
105. See Gray, supra note 21, at 571.
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that the other signatory countries will also abide by the Treaty re-
quirements. Even the perception of cheating or an attempt to hide a
violation might be sufficient to upset the delicate balance of strategic
military power that must exist before countries will agree to relin-
quish their own chemical weapons.106 Treaty analysts recognize that:
[i]f a perception of significant cheating grows, the incentive
mounts for a Treaty adherent to abandon the Treaty framework
(or to resort to secret cheating of its own) so as to counter the ad-
vantage potentially available to rivals. If the Treaty structure can-
not allay fears of undetected cheating, the Treaty will collapse un-
der the weight of its own lofty goals.107
In order to ensure compliance with arms-control Treaty require-
ments, the verification mechanisms of most arms control agreements
serve three goals: deterrence, detection, and assurance.108 A verifica-
tion regime that cannot act as an effective deterrent to cheating, al-
low for detection of noncompliance, or provide assurance of commit-
ment to its Treaty mandates, makes it all the more likely that dis-
trust will foster incentives to cheat.109 A flawed verification regime
may be worse than no verification regime at all. Therefore, the ful-
fillment of these goals necessarily entails intrusive and ambitious
on-site inspections.110 The ability to conduct random and short-notice
on-site inspections further strengthens the effectiveness of Treaty
verification schemes by promoting a deterrence-through-fear mental-
ity.111 Thus, the Treaty has incorporated a system of on-site chal-
lenge inspections designed to meet the verification needs of signatory
countries.
2.  The Importance of Challenge Inspections for Verification
The Treaty places few procedural constraints on the scope and lo-
cation of a challenge inspection.112 Thus, Treaty signatories may de-
mand a challenge inspection of any public or private facility in the
                                                                                                                   
106. Any deviation from the Treaty is a violation of international law. See, e.g., Patri-
cia B. McFate, Where Do We Go From Here? Verifying Future Arms-Control Agreements,
WASH. Q., Autumn 1992, at 75, 77.
107. Gray, supra note 21, at 571 (citing Benoit Morel, Verifiability & Enforceability of
the Treaty, in SHADOWS AND SUBSTANCE: THE TREATY 217-27 (Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson
eds., 1993)).
108. See generally WILLIAM F. ROWELL, ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION: A GUIDE TO
POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 1980S (1986).
109. See Gray, supra note 21, at 571-72.
110. See Defense Department Briefing, supra note 31 (noting that even if verification is
a difficult task, on-site inspections offer signatory nations a strong mechanism by which to
calm their fears of noncompliance).
111. See Koplow, supra note 72, at 280-82.
112. See TREATY, supra note 21, art. IX, ¶ 8, at 311.
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United States, even private homes and businesses.113 Additionally,
the Treaty does not limit the amount of challenge inspections any
one country may request or endure.114
The logic behind the Treaty’s liberal constraints on the amount
and scope of challenge inspections is derived from the fact that many
chemical weapons can be cheaply and easily produced115 and stored116
in relatively small and disguised facilities. Also, the equipment
needed to produce these weapons is the same “garden-variety
equipment” used by most commercial chemical manufacturers.117
Therefore, a complete arsenal of chemical weapons, including the
production equipment, could be hidden in a small building, ware-
house, or residence.118 The ease of production and the ability to con-
ceal chemical weapons makes their existence incredibly difficult to
verify.119
Especially troublesome is the dual-use nature of most of the
chemicals120 used in the production of chemical weapons.121 Many of
the chemicals used in the building of these weapons retain valuable
commercial purposes. Thiodiglycol, for example, is a common chemi-
cal used in the production of fountain and felt-tip pens.122 However,
                                                                                                                   
113. See Barry Kellman et al., Disarmament and Disclosure: How Arms Control Veri-
fication Can Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business Information, 36 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 71, 92 (1995) [hereinafter Kellman et al.]; see also Carnahan, supra note 2, at
180.
114. See Kathleen C. Bailey, Problems With the Treaty, in SHADOWS AND SUBSTANCE:
THE TREATY 17, 28-29 (Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson eds., 1993) (estimating that 120 chal-
lenge inspections will be performed each year).
115. The ability to manufacture chemical weapons by making the “basic compounds in
a kitchen sink, or a high school lab” is frightening. Robin Wright, Chemical Arms: Old and
Deadly Source Returns, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1988, at A1. Mustard gas, for example, can be
synthesized by mixing two chemicals in a vat. See Gray, supra note 21, at 574 (citing
Chemical Warfare: Ban the World’s Machineguns: Can’t Be Done? As Easy As Trying To
Get An Effective Global Ban on Chemical Weapons , ECONOMIST, June 4, 1988, at 19).
116. See Koplow, supra note 72, at 285-86 (stating that modern chemical weapons may
easily fit inside a suitcase or similarly sized container); see also Bailey, supra note 114, at
17.
117. Auerbach, supra note 2.
118. See Bailey, supra note 114, at 17-24 (explaining that a chemical weapons labora-
tory could fit within a structure as small as 1600 square feet).
119. See Auerbach, supra note 2; see also Bailey, supra note 114, at 18-20 (stating that
the best way to detect a violation is to test the residual traces of chemical ingredients).
Such testing justifies the inclusion of intrusive challenge inspections without the right to
refuse access.
120. See Bailey, supra note 114, at 24. Such dual-use chemicals are among those found
in Schedule Two, but are dominant in the list of Schedule Three chemicals. See TREATY,
supra note 21, Annex on Chemicals, Part B, Schedules Two, Three, at 330-31.
121. See Edward A. Tanzman, Constitutionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control
Inspections in the United States, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 21, 23 (1988) (citing George Bush for
a governmental acknowledgement that chemical weapons and commercial chemicals are
structurally similar, but have different uses).
122. See id.
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this same chemical is also the precursor chemical agent to the lethal
compound known as mustard gas.123
For these reasons, the Treaty grants each signatory nation the
right to conduct intrusive challenge inspections to ensure compliance
with the Treaty, including inspections of private commercial and
residential facilities.
C.  Challenges to the Legality of Challenge Inspections
Private individuals or businesses may file legal claims contesting
the constitutionality of the Treaty’s challenge inspections.124 These
potential plaintiffs must prove that the Treaty’s denial of injunctive
relief is unconstitutional and that the warrantless searches violate
the Fourth Amendment.125
To receive an injunction, a plaintiff would first need to test the
constitutionality of the Implementation Act’s prohibition against ju-
dicial relief. If this section of the Implementation Act is found uncon-
stitutional, a court would have the authority to issue a temporary re-
straining order or an injunction while considering the validity of the
related search warrant.
Second, a plaintiff must prove that the search warrant obtained
by the Lead Agency is invalid because it does not rise to the level of
                                                                                                                   
123. See Batsanov, supra note 22, at 20. Additional examples of such dual-use chemi-
cals include: (1) trimethyl-phosphate (used to develop insecticides but is a precursor to
nerve agents); (2) laundry detergent, (which may be easily converted into a chemical
weapon, see Richard Saltus, Chemical Weapons Ban Would Be Hard To Verify, Specialists
Say, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 1989, at A8); (3) hydrogen cyanide (a by-product of acrylic
manufacturing, see The Poison Gas Menace, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 1993, at C6); and (4)
some of the chemicals used to produce hand cream and fertilizer. Telephone Interview
with Jeff Nagler, Spokesperson, Chemical Weapons & Biological Weapons Arms Institute
(Jan. 17, 1996).
124. To correctly rule on these challenges, a court would have to balance two compet-
ing interests:
If the U.S. Congress were to pass legislation designed to contravene Consti-
tutional rights, court challenges would surely ensue. One of the main ques-
tions which probably would weigh in the judges’ minds would be that of benefit
to the public versus individual rights. That is, would inspections which could
result in verifying a chemical weapons ban not outweigh the costs of abridging
the Bill of Rights? In this context, it will become clear that inspection of facili-
ties will not result in sure verification and that cheating will be extremely
hard to detect. The question will then be whether the poor benefit of low-
confidence verification is worth what it will cost in terms of freedom and the
U.S. Constitution.
Bailey, supra note 114, at 33; see also id. at 18 (stating that there is no credible basis for
attempts at deriving an actual number of times that verifications may succeed, but esti-
mating verification will be successful less than 10% of the time).
125. This hearing is distinct from the Lead Agency’s ex parte hearing application for a
search warrant where a judicial official could deny the warrant because, on its face, the
warrant application lacks sufficient evidence of requisite Fourth Amendment probable
cause. See supra note 28.
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probable cause required by the Fourth Amendment.126 For example,
a plaintiff could argue that the inspection may demand production of
private documents or confidential business information that is unre-
lated to chemicals listed in the Treaty. If a court concludes that the
Lead Agency does not have probable cause to authorize the search,
the court may deny the challenge inspection by issuing an injunc-
tion. Moreover, companies hoping to protect critical and confidential
business information may request an injunction to prevent the Na-
tional Authority and international observers from conducting the
challenge inspection.127
A commentator has noted that the threat of loss of confidential
business information is inevitable given the structure of the verifi-
cation regime.128 The U.S. businesses targeted for a challenge in-
spection may refuse the search and seek injunctive relief from a fed-
eral district court.129 A district court judge will be faced with a Hob-
besian choice of either allowing an intrusive and wide-ranging
search to take place on private property, or issuing a temporary re-
straining order until a determination of the constitutionality of the
search can be made.130 A judicial determination could implicate the
constitutionality of the entire Implementation Act if the court de-
cides that the information the Treaty officials must provide to the
Lead Agency does not meet the probable-cause threshold required
for a warrant. The information provided by the Treaty director-
general to the National Authority will not, in all likelihood, include
specific evidentiary support. Any inspection based upon the minimal
                                                                                                                   
126. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 305(b)(4).
127. See Carnahan, supra note 2, at 180 (concluding that it is inevitable that some
property owner will refuse consent to a search); see also Kathleen C. Bailey, Chemical
Weapons: Say No to This Troubled Treaty, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1995, at A17 (noting that
companies feeling disadvantaged by the Treaty are virtually certain to claim that the
Treaty violates their rights against illegal search and seizure). A company’s confidential
business information might be stolen in two significant ways. First, foreign inspectors,
both the challenging State Party’s observer and the neutral Treaty inspectors, might
gather trade information and business secrets during the inspection. See Kellman et al.,
supra note 113, at 75-76. Second, the business’s own government may mistakenly release
confidential information or trade secrets and wrongly disseminate them to unauthorized
persons or agencies. See id.
128. “[I]t is inevitable that inspection rights associated with future arms control trea-
ties will enable inspectors, in pursuit of verification-related information, to collect signifi-
cant amounts of information having no colorable connection to the Treaty.” Koplow, supra
note 72, at 286.
129. See Kellman et al., supra note 113, at 75-76;
It is even possible that the company could be tempted to seek judicial in-
junctive relief from a forthcoming inspection or reporting requirement by
claiming that its constitutional property rights could be violated by arms con-
trol operations. If a United States court were to enjoin arms control verifica-
tion activities, however, the United States might be perceived as having vio-
lated its obligation to comply with the Treaty.
Id.
130. See Tanzman, supra note 121, at 67.
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allegations required by the Treaty would therefore be insufficient to
justify the issuance of a search warrant.
In a more likely scenario, the court will probably choose to limit
its decision to the facts of the immediate request for a search war-
rant. Yet, the denial of access to even one facility could result in a
perceived violation of the Treaty.131 Even so, the United States may
be perceived as having violated the Treaty without such judicial re-
fusals to issue certain warrants. A court that issues a temporary re-
straining order while deciding whether the prohibition on injunctive
relief is constitutional could inadvertently cause a Treaty violation if
the time for the court’s decision exceeded the timetables guaranteed
by the Treaty.132 John Holum, Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency (ACDA), recognized that such litigation delays
could force the United States to unintentionally abrogate its Treaty
obligations.133 A court’s initial denial may cause a State Party mem-
ber requesting an inspection to proclaim that the United States was
acting to hide a Treaty violation.
The drafters of the Implementation Act foresaw the possibility of
such a scenario, and concluded that some form of legislative pre-
emption was needed to prevent its occurrence.134 The government’s
proposed solution to this dilemma can be found in subsection 406(c)
of the Implementation Act. Subsection 406(c) prohibits any court
from issuing an injunction or other such order that might place the
United States in the position of having to violate the Treaty’s verifi-
cation imperatives.135
III.  THE APPLICATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS TO THE
TREATY AND IMPLEMENTATION ACT
A.  Constitutional Supremacy
An international treaty cannot authorize the United States gov-
ernment to act in ways contrary to the restraints and limitations im-
posed by the Constitution. In Reid v. Covert,136 the Supreme Court
held that “[i]t would be manifestly contrary to the objectives [of the
Founding Fathers] . . . let alone alien to our entire constitutional his-
tory and tradition—to construe the Fourth Amendment as permit-
ting the United States to exercise power under an international
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions.”137
                                                                                                                   
131. See Koplow, supra note 72, at 355-56.
132. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, §§ 401(d), 402(a).
133. See Defense Department Briefing, supra note 31.
134. See id.
135. See Implementation Act, supra  note 24, § 406(c).
136. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
137. Id. at 17.
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The supremacy of the Constitution in relation to international
treaties is regarded as settled in the Restatement (Third) of the Fo r-
eign Relation Law of the United States : “No provision of an interna-
tional agreement may contravene any of the prohibitions or limita-
tions of the Constitution applicable to the exercise of authority by
the United States.”138 Therefore, when the Constitution and a treaty
conflict, the treaty obligations agreed to by the United States gov-
ernment are subservient to the protections afforded to individuals
under the Constitution.
The Treaty is no exception to the above hierarchy of law. The pro-
tections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are fundamental and
cannot be bargained away by the government, even under the guise
of protecting national security through an international agree-
ment.139 This constitutional rule remains true, even in the face of a
treaty as important as this Treaty.
Traditionally, however, courts have been unwilling to invalidate
international treaties on the grounds that they violate the Constitu-
tion.140 Because treaties are negotiated and signed by the President
and ratified by Congress, courts will usually either afford the Treaty
a presumption of validity,141 or rely upon the political question doc-
trine to avoid a judgment on the merits.142 While the judiciary has
shown consistent deference to treaties involving national security
and other political questions, courts may still choose to exercise their
adjudicatory authority when treaties infringe upon individual
rights.143 As one commentator noted, cases involving foreign policy
issues juxtaposed with individual rights are: “not a domain where
courts should fear to tread, looking about for unaccustomed dangers.
                                                                                                                   
138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
302(2) (1986).
139. See Koplow, supra note 72, at 357.
140. See David A. Koplow, Back to the Future and Up to the Sky: Legal Implications of
“Open Skies” Inspection for Arms Control, 79 CAL. L. REV. 421, 456 n.81 (1991) (citing
DENNIS S. ARONOWITZ, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 19-20 (1965)).
141. See id.
142. Based on the desire to avoid violations of separation of powers, courts will often
avoid reaching the merits of a case based on what has become known as the political
question doctrine.
The “political question doctrine” posits that some constitutional issues are not
justiciable, because the issue is committed to the political branches of govern-
ment (Congress and the President). Recall the suggestion in Marbury that,
where the President or another executive branch official had “legal discretion,”
the judiciary would not grant relief. The modern way of putting this is to say
that the issue is political and not legal, or that there are “no judicially cogni-
zable standards” by which a court could resolve a dispute involving one or both
of the coordinate branches of government.
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD
CENTURY 1028 (1993).
143. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Indeed, this is the very essence of the judicial function in our consti-
tutional system.”144 The Supreme Court has never supposed that ju-
dicial deference is absolutely necessary in every action involving
foreign policy. In Baker v. Carr,145 for instance, the Court stated that
“it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”146 This is especially
true when a plaintiff alleges that a treaty or a statute implicating
foreign policy infringes upon constitutionally guaranteed individual
rights.
In this manner, the Supreme Court has distinguished cases in-
volving disputes between co-equal branches of government and cases
involving individual rights where the judiciary finds itself as the sole
form of relief.147 Actions involving potential abuses of individual
rights receive more deference from the courts because these chal-
lenges strike at the very heart of the judicial function.148 With this
distinction in mind, the Supreme Court has never invoked the politi-
cal question doctrine to avoid determination on the merits of a claim
where the promotion of foreign policy has come into conflict with the
protection of individual liberties.149
B.  General Fourth Amendment Analysis
1.  Challenge Inspections as Searches
In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court de-
fines a “search” as having been conducted when a government offi-
cial’s actions intrude upon an individual’s objective and reasonable
                                                                                                                   
144. Gray, supra note 21, at 620 n.330 (citing LEWIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM,
DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990)).
145. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
146. Id. at 211 (discussing the justiciability of an action brought by voters in Tennes-
see to challenge the apportionment of votes for the state’s General Assembly).
147. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(discussing claims of violations of individual rights without non-judicial remedies, as dis-
tinguished from political questions).
148. See David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity
of Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 632 (1983) (noting that
Fourth Amendment rights are especially deserving of protection).
The law should be wary of exemptions that appeal to overwhelming interests and thus
carry too great a presumption of validity: “[P]rinciples of law, once bent, do not snap back
easily.” Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 655 (1989) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dan-
gers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
149. See Lewis Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 485 n.6 (1972); see
also Gray, supra note 21, at 620 n.330.
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expectation of privacy.150 Most businesses and residences maintain a
reasonable expectation of privacy because they are not pervasively
regulated by the United States government—especially those indus-
tries that do not perform defense contracting work.151 Nor do these
individuals or businesses possess a close nexus to the obligations
and mandates imposed on the United States and its citizens by the
Treaty.152 These businesses or residences are simply caught under
the broad reach of the Treaty’s verification mechanism. Therefore,
commentators seem to universally agree that challenge inspections
conducted in the United States would constitute a search deserving
of constitutional protection.153 The Implementation Act even con-
cedes that such an intrusion would be a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment because it requires the United States Lead Agency to
obtain a search warrant.154
2.  Constitutional Warrant Requirement
In Katz v. United States ,155 the Supreme Court interpreted the
Warrant Requirement Clause as the primary clause of the Fourth
Amendment.156 The Supreme Court held that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable, except in carefully delineated exceptions.157
More recently, however, it appears that the Supreme Court is turn-
ing back to the view that the reasonableness clause, the first portion
of the Fourth Amendment, should take precedence over the warrant
                                                                                                                   
150. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that an
individual had an objective and subjective reasonable expectation of privacy while talking
in a closed telephone booth); see also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a
General Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
119, 123 (1989) (discussing Katz and its progeny).
151. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967):
The businessman, like an occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to
go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private
commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy
if the decision to enter and inspect for a violation of regulatory laws can be
made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evi-
denced by a warrant.
Id.; see also Carnahan, supra note 2, at 180 (citing Dow Chemical v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (stating that even a highly regulated chemical industry has a reason-
able, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy that society must observe)).
152. See Carnahan, supra note 2, at 180.
153. See Gray, supra note 21, at 622 nn.340-44 (citing additional commentators who
concluded that challenge inspections are searches within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment). These commentators include DENNIS S. ARONOWITZ, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 104-09 (1965); Henkin, supra note
149, at 59; Koplow, supra note 72, at 351; and Tanzman, supra note 121, at 61.
154. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406 (a)(1).
155. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
156. See id. at 354-55 (applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to the ne-
cessity for warrant requirement).
157. See id. at 357; see also Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (arguing
that warrantless searches will render the Fourth amendment meaningless).
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clause.158 Yet, the justices are not reverting to the supremacy of the
reasonableness interpretation by directly overruling warrant re-
quirement standards; instead, the Supreme Court has been expand-
ing the exceptions to the traditional warrant requirement stan-
dards.159
In Illinois v. Gates,160 the Supreme Court abandoned a rigid two-
pronged test for determining whether an informant’s tip established
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant.161 In its place, the
Court adopted a “totality of the circumstances” approach, and found
that probable cause for a warrant to search a defendant’s home and
automobile was established by an anonymous letter indicating that
the defendants were involved in interstate drug trafficking.162 The
Gates test considered both the veracity and reliability of the factual
account giving rise to the request for judicial permission to conduct a
search.163 Probable cause exists when facts and circumstances suffi-
ciently cause a prudent person to believe that the evidence to be
seized is at the place to be searched.164 This test for probable cause
adopts a “totality of the circumstances” approach which balances in-
terrelated factors including the informant’s “reliability” or “veracity”
and “basis of knowledge.”165 The “reliability” or “veracity” factor ex-
amines the informant’s reputation for accuracy.166 The “basis of
knowledge” factor examines how the informant gathered the infor-
mation, either through first hand knowledge or by offering suffi-
ciently specific details of the criminal activity.167 While the Gates test
does not require that both factors be met, the interrelated consid-
                                                                                                                   
158. See Wasserstrom, supra note 150, at 124 (stating that the Supreme Court has
used the Katz expectation of privacy analysis to exempt additional official investigations
from Fourth Amendment restraints).
159. See id. at 121 (noting that beginning with the Burger Court, the Supreme Court
began boring away at the warrant requirement by expanding and exploiting exceptions to
the expectation of privacy test).
160. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
161. See id. at 230.
162. See id. at 230–38.
163. See id. at 238. In Gates, the Supreme Court abandoned the former Agui-
lar/Spinelli two-pronged test, in which each prong required separate analysis. The Court
replaced this test by applying a reasonableness test focusing on the totality of the circum-
stances. The Gates Court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supply-
ing hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Id. at 238; see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 114-15 (1964).
164. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
165. Id. at 233.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 234.
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erations help the court determine whether probable cause exists un-
der the “totality of the circumstances.”168
Additionally, courts apply a particularity requirement to requests
for a criminal warrant.169 The potential evidence must be sufficiently
described so as to limit the discretion an officer may exercise in exe-
cuting the warrant.170
In the instance of challenge inspections of private businesses or
residences, the U.S. National Authority probably could not obtain a
valid criminal search warrant under the current standards. First,
the Lead Agency, through the U.S. National Authority and the De-
partment of Justice, will operate only with information supplied by
the director general. In turn, the director general will likely possess
minimal details provided by the State Party member requesting the
challenge inspection.171 The procedure for a challenge inspection by
Treaty officials does not carry an evidentiary burden; mere written
allegations based upon conjecture suffice.172 For a judge issuing a
warrant in the United States, however, this information will fall
well-short of the burdens necessary to prove probable cause before a
criminal warrant may be issued.173
The information provided by the State Party member requesting
a challenge inspection that is handed over to the United States Na-
tional Authority will probably fail to meet the Gates standard.174 The
requesting State Party member need only allege possible noncompli-
ance with the Treaty in order to demand a challenge inspection.175
The requesting State Party member is not required to produce any
evidence that the target facility may have chemical weapons or any
of their prohibited components. Therefore, no means exist to deter-
                                                                                                                   
168. See id. at 233.
169. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927);
United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1982).
170. See Marron, 275 U.S. at 196 (ruling that the items to be seized must be described
in the warrant with such particularity that it leaves little to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant).
171. See TREATY, supra note 21, art. IX, ¶¶ 14-15, at 312; see also id. Annex on Im-
plementation and Verification, Part X, ¶¶ 4-6, at 428-29 (requiring the requesting State
Party member to submit the following information: (a) the Host State Party member to be
inspected; (b) the point of entry; (c) the size and type of inspection site; (d) the concern of
non-compliance, the provisions of the Treaty believed to have been violated, and the na-
ture, circumstances, and information giving rise to the concern for possible non-
compliance).
172. See id. art. IX, ¶¶ 14-15, at 312; see also id. Annex on Implementation and Verifi-
cation, Part X, ¶¶ 4-6, at 428-29.
173. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
174. See id.
175. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, ¶
4, at 428-29. Subparagraph (d) does not require the requesting State Party member to
provide any proof or evidence to support its allegation. See id. at 429. The Treaty merely
requires a description of the nature of the actions giving rise to the Treaty violation. See
id. ¶ 4(d), at 429.
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mine the truthfulness of the information upon which the Lead
Agency relies in order to obtain the warrant. The lack of evidence re-
quired by the Treaty falls far short of the level of proof required by
the veracity and reliability considerations of the Fourth Amend-
ment.176
Furthermore, the Lead Agency will probably be incapable of pro-
viding evidence to support the reliability of the informant. When fac-
toring the reliability of the informant into the “totality of the circum-
stances” equation, courts examine the reputation of the informant,
not the reputation of the government official seeking the warrant.177
However, the Treaty does not require the requesting State Party
member to produce any evidence or information about how it gath-
ered the information giving rise to its suspicions. Under the Treaty’s
mandates, the requesting State Party member is under no obligation
to divulge the identity of its informant, or even how it obtained in-
formation leading to the request for a challenge inspection.178 The
apparent assumption is that such information resulted from espio-
nage and other intelligence-gathering sources. Thus, a court proba-
bly would not have evidence of probable cause concerning the reli-
ability of the information or how it was obtained.
The information used by the National Authority to obtain a valid
search warrant will probably also fail the particularity requirement,
which mandates that government officials identify the specific por-
tions of the facility and the items expected to be found.179 Yet, the
only burden imposed on the requesting State Party member by the
Treaty is to name the country and target facility against which the
challenge inspection will be conducted.180 The requesting State Party
member need not list the specific parts of the facility to be searched
or what evidence it expects to uncover during the inspection.
Without this latitude, the objectives of the verification regime
(deterrence, detection, and assurance) are undermined. Without a
solid verification mechanism, the effective implementation of the
Treaty becomes impossible. However, the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment has been narrowly interpreted so as to prevent govern-
ment officials from having such discretion in the scope of their
searches. Therefore, the minimum requirements to demand a chal-
                                                                                                                   
176. The Constitution requires probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. See U. S.
CONST. amend. IV.
177. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
178. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, ¶
4, at 428-29.
179. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
180. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, ¶
4, at 428-29.
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lenge inspection are insufficient to meet the probable cause require-
ments for a search warrant.
The Lead Agency will likely have insufficient evidence and infor-
mation to obtain a search warrant because on its face, the warrant
application lacks proof of its veracity, reliability, and particularity.
Based upon the information provided to the court, the judge must ei-
ther deny the warrant application or ignore the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.
In instances where a private owner refuses consent, the delay
may cause the United States to be in procedural violation of the
Treaty’s verification regime. The Treaty requires the Host State
Party member’s National Authority to ensure that the challenge in-
spections are conducted in accordance with the timetables of the
Treaty, and to prevent denials of access. Should the National
Authority’s failure to obtain a warrant delay or impede access to a
suspected facility, the United States may be perceived as attempting
to cover up suspected production or storage of chemical weapons.181
Therefore, the Lead Agency must look for alternative means to
authorize the Implementation Act’s search warrant requirement for
challenge inspections of private, non-chemical facilities inside the
United States.
C.  Administrative Searches
The Supreme Court stated in Katz that warrantless searches are
per se unconstitutional unless they fall within clearly defined excep-
tions.182 Since Katz, more conservative Supreme Court decisions have
sought to weaken warrant requirements by not only extending the
size and scope of its recognized exceptions, but also by creating ad-
ditional exceptions.183 As will be shown, however, most of these ex-
                                                                                                                   
181. The only solution to this dilemma is for the Lead Agency to have evidence from
the requesting State Party member to support its allegations. However, it is unlikely that
a member who already suspects a substantive violation of the Treaty will provide addi-
tional information. See id. ¶ 4, at 428-29.
182. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
183. See Wasserstrom, supra note 150, at 121-24.
184. The Supreme Court has recognized some exceptions to the criminal warrant re-
quirements. Thus, courts will likely grant an emergency exception when circumstances
compel the police to act immediately because of the risk of the destruction of evidence or
the escape of the suspect, and when it would be impractical for the officers to obtain a
warrant. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984) (citing Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) (allowing warrantless home arrests of felony suspects and giving
lower courts discretion to apply proper bounds to this exception)).
Courts may also grant a warrant when there is a “hot pursuit.” See Welsh, 466 U.S. at
753. Hot pursuit requires that there be “immediate or continuous pursuit of the [the sub-
ject] from the scene of the crime.” Id. (appearing to limit the hot pursuit exception to seri-
ous crimes and excluding misdemeanors).
There is also an exception that allows officers to search a felony arrest suspect and the
area immediately surrounding the subject of an arrest, but the exception limits the scope
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ceptions are inapplicable to challenge inspections.184 Instead, the
United States National Authority might seek an administrative war-
rant to conduct the challenge inspection search. The rationale be-
hind administrative warrants is that they are part of a “regulatory
scheme” that is “civil rather than criminal in nature.”185 Thus, they
do not violate the Constitution because they are “limited in scope”
and may not be exercised in unreasonable circumstances.186 A typical
example of an administrative warrant includes the type of broad-
based warrant granted to public health and safety officials, such as
fire marshals, for the enforcement of municipal safety regulations.187
The drafters of the Implementation Act were aware of the prob-
able impracticability of obtaining a criminal search warrant for a
challenge inspection; thus, they authorized the United States Na-
tional Authority to acquire an administrative warrant.188 Instead of
meeting criminal probable cause standards, administrative warrants
require the court to apply only a reasonableness balancing test.189
The Implementation Act specifically provides for issuance of
search warrants by government officials or courts so that challenge
inspections will comply with Fourth Amendment requirements.190
The warrants may be granted “on the basis of ‘administrative prob-
able cause,’ i.e., the standards for issuing warrants for administra-
                                                                                                                   
of the search to the space within the suspect’s grasp. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 763 (1969); see also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1990) (allowing protec-
tive sweeps of houses where an arrest has been made); United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (stating that
the doctrine justifying the search incident to arrest applies to the time period occurring
contemporaneously with the arrest)).
The warrantless search of a vehicle is permissible if an officer has probable cause to ex-
pect to find evidence of a crime. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925).
This exception permits the warrantless examination of impounded vehicles and the per-
sonal effects found inside to account for the owner’s property. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 371-72 (1987); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (applying
inventory searches to a suspect’s person). An additional exception permits a police officer
to stop and frisk a suspect if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a
crime is afoot, and it would be impractical to obtain a warrant. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 (1968). Police may search a premise or vehicle if the owner gives voluntary consent.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
In addition, an officer may make a warrantless seizure of incriminating evidence that is
in open view while the officer conducts a lawful search, entry, or arrest. See Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990).
185. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
186. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877 n.4 (1987) (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978)).
187. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
188. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(a); see also supra note 154; supra
Part II.B.
189. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538-39; supra Part II.C.
190. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 305.
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tive inspections rather than the standards used for criminal
searches.”191
1.  The Camara Standard for Administrative Search Warrants
In 1967, the Supreme Court created an exception to the criminal
search warrant requirement in instances when the search is con-
ducted to enforce municipal health or safety codes.192 In Camara v.
Municipal Court ,193 eight of the nine justices held that warrantless
administrative searches of individuals’ homes based on suspicion of
noncompliance with municipal codes violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.194 The justices found that such administrative searches signifi-
cantly intruded upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
and would subject citizens to unreasonable intrusions by government
health or safety inspectors in the field.195 However, the Court also
stated that broad administrative searches in the public interest were
valid and, thus, it was appropriate to grant them in accordance with
a reasonableness standard rather than requiring probable cause.196
The Court based its decision on the finding that administrative
searches differ from criminal searches because they seek to deter
and correct violations of health and safety regulations, not to seize
                                                                                                                   
191. Letter from John D. Holum, Director, ACDA, to George J. Mitchell, Senate Ma-
jority Leader (May 27, 1994) (on file with authors); see also Implementation Act, supra
note 24, § 406(a).
192. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 540. Normally, one might expect that a government of-
ficial wishing to enforce a health or safety code would first seek an individual’s consent to
search before resorting to the courts for a search warrant. However, in the case of the
challenge inspection searches permitted by the Treaty, it seems unlikely that National
Authority officials will waste precious time seeking a business’s consent. Most businesses
are likely to refuse such consent anyway, and will likely petition the courts to prevent the
search.
193. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
194. See id. at 540. In Camara, San Francisco housing inspectors conducted routine
housing code inspections in an apartment building. See id. at 526. Informed by an apart-
ment manager that Camara was using the ground floor leasehold as a personal residence
in violation of occupancy permits, the inspector “confronted appellant and demanded that
he permit an inspection of the premises.” Id. Camara refused on three separate occasions
to allow inspections without search warrants. See id. at 526-27. Camara was charged with
refusing to permit a lawful inspection pursuant to the relevant San Francisco Municipal
Code and was arrested. See id.
195. See id. at 532.
196. The rationale for the Camara Court’s distinction between administrative and
criminal searches is based upon the Court’s recognition that enforcement of basic health
and safety regulations sometimes demands routine and broad-sweeping searches. For in-
stance, housing inspectors must have the ability to quickly gain access to several city
blocks or to an entire residential neighborhood. Housing inspectors need timely access to
the facilities in question to prevent landlords from possibly stalling the inspectors at the
door while making efforts to correct violations. Otherwise, stalling tactics destroy the de-
terrence effect of housing code enforcement. See id. at 534–39.
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evidence of a crime.197 The Court also noted that emergency situa-
tions involving the public’s health or safety further justified the is-
suance of administrative warrants.198
The Court applied a reasonableness test, which is a balancing of
government’s need to search against the invasion the search en-
tails.199 The Court noted:
The warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision
to search private property is justified by a reasonable governmen-
tal interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a
valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then
there is probable cause to issue a suitably restricted search war-
rant.200
Initially, government must prove there is a legitimate govern-
mental purpose that serves the public interest underlying the
search.201 However, the focus is not on whether the public interest
justifies the search, but whether it justifies the disregard of probable
cause.202 The question turns on whether “the burden of obtaining a
warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.”203 Further, the regulatory scheme used by the government to
serve this purpose must be a logical, particular, and comprehensive
plan that provides a check against random, arbitrary, or selective in-
spections.204 These Fourth Amendment constraints serve to prevent
                                                                                                                   
197. See id. at 535-36. The rationale behind administrative warrants is that they are
part of a “regulatory scheme” that is “civil rather than criminal in nature;” thus, they do
not violate the Constitution because they are “limited in scope” and not available in un-
reasonable circumstances. Id. at 528.
198. See id. at 539.
199. See id. at 536-37. The Supreme Court later clarified its opinion as to why the
traditional probable cause test is not applied to administrative warrant requests: “The
probable-cause approach is unhelpful when analysis centers upon the reasonableness of
routine administrative caretaking functions, particularly when no claim is made that the
protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations.” Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987).
200. Camara, 387 U.S. at 539.
201. For instance, the Camara Court found that “the inspection programs at issue
here are aimed at securing city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards for
private property.” Id. at 535. The governmental purpose in enforcing municipal housing
codes in Camara was derived from the state police powers to promote health and safety.
This is evidenced by two factors of the balancing test used by the Camara Court: (1) that
“such [administrative] programs have a long history of judicial and public acceptance,”
and (2) that the “public interest” be free from dangerous conditions. Id. at 537.
202. See id. at 534-35.
203. Id. at 533 (“It has nowhere been urged that fire, health, and housing code inspec-
tion programs could not achieve their goals within the confines of a reasonable search
warrant requirement. Thus, we do not find the public need argument dispositive.”).
204. See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE 86 (1992) (“The justification envisioned in Camara is designed simply to insure
evenhandedness and to avoid arbitrary or selected enforcement. . . . The constraints
placed upon administrative searches operate, therefore, not to insure prior knowledge of
probable wrongdoing, but to limit discretion and prevent arbitrary treatment of individu-
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governmental “fishing expeditions” into private buildings or resi-
dences.
For the individual, the balancing test focuses upon the individ-
ual’s expectation of privacy as best determined by the character of
the place to be searched,205 the individual’s right to be free from un-
warranted governmental intrusion, as measured by the probable
fruitfulness of the government’s search,206 and the level of intrusive-
ness permitted by the warrant.207 Therefore, the final decision should
be determined by weighing government’s need to search against the
potential violation of the individual’s rights.
2.  The Inapplicability of Administrative Search Warrants to
Challenge Inspections
Given the Supreme Court’s balancing test for administrative
search warrants, certain commentators suggest that the judiciary
will be receptive to requests by the National Authority or other gov-
ernment officials to issue administrative search warrants to conduct
challenge inspections in the United States.208 However, courts and
government officials should refuse to grant administrative search
warrants to facilitate challenge inspections for numerous reasons.
First, courts and government officials should refuse to grant ad-
ministrative search warrants for challenge inspections because of
the individual’s right to privacy. Individuals and most businesses
possess a high expectation of privacy in the residence or facility in
which they operate.209 The typical home or business in the United
States has no relation whatsoever to the restrictions imposed on the
United States government and its industries by the Treaty. Yet, the
Treaty’s broad-based verification regime permits an international
team of inspectors to search every home or facility.210
                                                                                                                   
als.”); see also Koplow, supra note 72, at 351 (noting that the issuance of administrative
search warrants requires an orderly and comprehensive inspection plan of all similarly
situated properties).
205. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 538 (stating that the court should consider the nature of
the building and the surrounding area).
206. See id. at 539 (weighing a valid public interest against the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
207. See id. at 537. The Camara Court envisioned that administrative searches would
be minimal intrusions when it stated that “because the inspections are neither personal in
nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited
invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.” Id.
208. See Gray, supra note 21, at 633 n.408.
209. See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967) (holding that administrative
entry into non-public portions of a commercial property may only be done with a warrant).
210. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
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Second, despite the deterrence effect that the potential challenge
inspections may create,211 the likelihood that they will actually un-
cover evidence of noncompliance seems remote.212 Even assuming
that the requesting State Party member relies in good faith upon
evidence it has collected through intelligence gathering, it is improb-
able that a challenge inspection could discover instances of non-
compliance, given the ease with which chemical weapons are trans-
ported and hidden.213 Based upon the information given to the
United States National Authority, the lead agency will likely lack
sufficient evidence, when scrutinized by Fourth Amendment stan-
dards, to support a claim that discovering the alleged chemical
weapons is probable. Considering the small likelihood that the chal-
lenge inspection search will produce evidence of noncompliance, a
neutral and detached magistrate should reject the initial application
for any form of warrant.
Third, the scope of the challenge inspections authorized by the
Treaty is extremely broad. Inspectors are permitted to search all ar-
eas of the facility, limited only by the Host State Party member’s
proof that the areas restricted from the search are not related to
Treaty compliance.214 The inspection may include taking chemical
samples, company records, documents, and computer files for analy-
sis. The level of intrusion permitted by the challenge inspections far
surpasses the level of intrusion envisioned by the Camara Court
when it outlined administrative search requirements based on a
relatively minimal invasion of privacy.215
Finally, the request for an administrative search warrant to con-
duct a challenge inspection will not likely include a logical, particu-
lar, and comprehensive plan. On the contrary, government officials
will likely seek an administrative search warrant to allow them to
conduct a selective inspection of a single facility.216 Further, the
scope of the search is unlimited. The requesting State Party member
is permitted to investigate, examine, and test anything in or around
                                                                                                                   
211. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
Treaty’s verification regime creates a deterrent effect against noncompliance; see also
Koplow, supra note 72, at 356 (concluding that such intrusive verification measures have
“too many potential targets and too few inspectors,” and thus the likelihood of detection
remains small).
212. See Koplow, supra note 72, at 356.
213. However, under the Treaty, Requesting State Parties are not compelled to pro-
duce their reasons for requesting a challenge inspection. It is highly doubtful that these
State Parties would divulge espionage secrets when not required to do so.
214. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, §
C, at 434-38.
215. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
216. Because a challenge inspection is directed at a single facility, any request for an
administrative warrant will most likely not be based on such a comprehensive or broad-
based plan.
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the facility, as long as the established time restrictions are met.217
The Camara Court recognized that this type of search does not meet
the standards for granting an administrative search warrant under
the reasonableness balancing test.218
D.  The Pervasively Regulated Industry Exception to the
Administrative Search Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court carved an exception to the Camara ruling by
permitting warrantless administrative searches if the business to be
inspected is a pervasively regulated industry (PRI).219 The PRI ex-
ception has evolved from a doctrine of implied consent220 to a doctrine
that focuses on the subjective expectation of privacy claimed by the
property owner.221 Under this exception, characterization of the tar-
get business’s commercial practice becomes crucial.222 If the PRI ex-
ception applies, an entire class of warrantless searches are author-
ized and an official may demand unimpeded entry to the facility.223
That right of entry may also authorize the use of force to gain access
to the facility in fulfillment of the official’s mission.224
1.  Explanation of the Pervasively Regulated Industry Search
Warrant Exception
In Donovan v. Dewey ,225 the Supreme Court created a two-pronged
test to determine whether a warrantless administrative search
would be constitutionally permissible. The first prong deals with the
objective government interest in conducting a search. The second
                                                                                                                   
217. This does not include the Host State Party member’s ability to limit the investi-
gation because of constitutional or national security concerns. However, as stated above,
such limits could not be effectively used.
218. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
219. See, e.g., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970)
(holding that no warrant is required to inspect a liquor industry business based upon a
long-standing congressional regulation).
220. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (ruling that a property
owner who chooses to conduct business in a pervasively regulated industry impliedly con-
sented to routine warrantless administrative searches).
221. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 601, 603-05 (1981) (shifting by implication
the PRI exception from a doctrine of implied consent to one that applies a test based on
two considerations: the pervasiveness of government regulation and the individual’s sub-
jective expectation of privacy); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711 (1987)
(reformulating the Donovan test to clarify procedural safeguards necessary for the protec-
tion of the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy including consideration of time,
place, and scope of inspection).
222. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-03.
223. See id.
224. See Koplow, supra note 72, at 310.
225. 452 U.S. 594 (1981). In Donovan, the Secretary of Labor brought suit seeking to
enjoin a company from refusing to permit warrantless searches of its mining facilities
pursuant to the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1977. See id. at 596.
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prong uses the owner’s subjective expectation of privacy to determine
if the regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to justify a warrant-
less search. When “Congress has reasonably determined that war-
rantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme,”226
and “federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and
defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be
aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections under-
taken for specific purposes, a warrantless search is constitutionally
permissible.”227
The Donovan Court also demanded a procedural safeguard of the
individual’s privacy interest—that the pervasive government regu-
lation must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a war-
rant.228 In determining whether a constitutionally adequate substi-
tute exists, the court must utilize two criteria based upon a review of
the textual mandates of the government regulation. First, does the
regulation sufficiently limit the discretion of the inspectors?229 Sec-
ond, is the inspection scheme sufficiently comprehensive and pre-
dictable so that the property owner could be on notice of the likeli-
hood of inspection?230 In answer to the second question, the Donovan
Court considered four factors: the regularity of searches; the fre-
quency of searches; the duration of the scheme; and the ubiquity of
the inspections.231 The Court rejected the legality of random, infre-
quent, or unpredictable warrantless searches, especially when an in-
spection is so infrequent as to cause the owner to doubt whether his
facility will ever be searched.232
Finally, the Donovan decision seemed to suggest that Congress
may be limited when formulating its regulations to meet the PRI ex-
ception. The Court refused to permit Congress to cross industry lines
with its regulatory scheme.233 Instead, the Court found government
regulation must narrowly target a single industry.234 This restriction
                                                                                                                   
226. Id. at 600.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 603.
229. See id. at 600.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 599, 605-06.
232. “[W]arrantless inspections of commercial property may be constitutionally objec-
tionable if their occurrence is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for
all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property from time to time [will] be
inspected by government officials.” Id. at 599; see also Gray, supra note 21, at 618;
Tanzman, supra note 121, at 48.
233. See Gray, supra note 21, at 618.
234. See id. This Article does not address the constitutionality of the Implementation
Act’s regulation of the chemical industry. The chemical industry is already heavily regu-
lated and since the production of chemical weapons is generally illegal, industries produc-
ing chemical weapons do so under the guidance and license of the United States govern-
ment. These specific industries are already subject to mandatory inspections under the
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increases the likelihood that a rational property owner will be aware
of the measures designed to regulate that owner’s particular busi-
ness.
In New York v. Burger ,235 the Supreme Court reformulated the
considerations proposed in Donovan.236 The initial threshold ques-
tion applied by the justices in Burger was whether the industry in
question was closely regulated.237 The Burger Court replaced the
Donovan two-pronged test with its own three-pronged variation. The
first prong requires that the regulatory scheme be justified by a sub-
stantial governmental interest.238 The second prong demands that
warrantless searches be necessary to further the regulatory
scheme.239 The third prong requires the inspection program to pro-
vide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.240
In applying the Burger test for deciding whether an industry is
pervasively regulated, the dominant theme in recent case law has fo-
cused on the property owner’s subjective expectation of privacy.241
Courts use numerous factors espoused by the Burger justices to
reach a conclusion on whether or not an industry is pervasively
regulated. In addition to applying three of the four Donovan fac-
tors,242 the Burger test also added consideration of any licensing or
reporting requirements, the existence of fines or safety standards to
enforce the regulations, the tradition of governmental regulation of
this industry, and the inescapability of governmental control.243
The Burger Court’s concentration on the target property owner’s
subjective expectation of privacy is the logical focus of the PRI ex-
ception. By definition, an owner who is unaware of significant gov-
ernmental regulation of his or her industry cannot have the lessened
expectation of privacy necessary to justify a warrantless adminis-
                                                                                                                   
Treaty and do not raise constitutional issues because they include governmental involve-
ment in the production and storage of chemical weapons.
235. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
236. See id. at 707. In Burger, the regulation authorized warrantless searches of
automobile junkyards and permitted police to examine the owner’s record books, as well
as the vehicles themselves. See id. at 711-12.
237. See id. at 701-02.
238. See id. at 702.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 703. In Burger, the search was limited to inspections of vehicle dis-
mantling industries during normal business hours. The scope of the search was also lim-
ited to the owner’s records and the vehicles themselves. The statute included a require-
ment that the operator be informed that the business was subject to inspection, that the
standards of potential inspections be identified, and that the time, place, and scope of the
inspection be identified. See id. at 711.
241. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dis-
senting); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
242. The three factors mentioned by the Court were regularity, intensity, and fre-
quency of searches. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
243. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703.
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trative search. Conversely, an owner who is aware of significant gov-
ernmental regulation should expect to be subject to frequent and
routine searches. Thus, when courts demand that an industry be
found pervasively regulated before applying the three-pronged Bur-
ger test, they ask whether the regulation is so pervasive that the
owner could not escape awareness of the regulation’s existence.
2.  The Application of the Pervasively Regulated Industry Search
Warrant Exception to the Treaty Challenge Inspections
If the United States National Authority cannot obtain an admin-
istrative warrant under Camara,244 the Department of Justice may
attempt to justify a warrantless search as a PRI exception to prevent
incidental abrogation of the Treaty. Since the PRI exception allows
warrantless administrative searches without judicial scrutiny prior
to the search, the National Authority will only need to fulfill the re-
quirements of the Burger test to validate their search. However, the
National Authority probably cannot meet the Burger standards for
conducting a warrantless challenge inspection search.245
Challenge inspections of private commercial businesses would
probably fail the Burger test for several reasons. First, private busi-
nesses that do not have a direct or close connection to the Treaty, but
which are still subject to the scope of possible challenge inspections,
maintain a high expectation of privacy.246 For instance, pen factories,
pesticide producers, and fertilizer manufacturers use chemicals that
the Treaty specifically lists and attempts to control, yet these indus-
tries, not being pervasively regulated, have no reason to expect a
search for evidence of chemical weapons production.247 These indus-
tries lack a clear nexus to the obligations imposed on the United
States government by the Treaty, and therefore lack the requisite
notice to constitute a lessened expectation of privacy, which is
needed for unwarranted intrusions. This lack of notice is demon-
strated by the fact that many of the “other” chemicals that fall out-
side the bounds of the Treaty’s three schedules are not even men-
tioned by the Treaty, yet are still within the scope of verification.248
                                                                                                                   
244. See supra Part III.C.1 (explaining Camara and applying it to the Treaty chal-
lenge inspections).
245. Other authors have concluded that challenge inspections fail to pass constitu-
tional muster under the current PRI exception. See Gray, supra note 21, at 632-33;
Tanzman, supra note 121, at 48-54.
246. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the high expectation of privacy associated with
most businesses subject to a challenge inspection).
247. See Tanzman, supra note 121, at 53 (stating that “[s]urely such enterprises could
not be on notice that being uninvolved in the chemical weapons industry makes them fair
game for warrantless searches to assure U.S. compliance with a chemical weapons
treaty”).
248. See Gray, supra note 21, at 619.
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The result is that the National Authority cannot prove that a vast
majority of the businesses subject to challenge inspections possess a
lessened expectation of privacy.
Second, the challenge inspection of private, non-related industries
would be too irregular and infrequent for a company owner to rea-
sonably expect the business to be searched.249 The United States has
thousands of companies potentially subject to challenge inspections,
but in all likelihood only a few will ever actually be searched by
Treaty inspectors. This is contrary to the Burger Court’s require-
ment that all of the businesses under the scope of the regulation be
routinely searched, and that the only randomness involved be the
order in which the searches are conducted.250
Further, industries selected for inspection can be arbitrarily cho-
sen by a foreign State Party member.251 While the Treaty requires
the State Party member requesting the challenge inspection to offer
some level of suspicion of noncompliance with Treaty mandates, the
foreign State Party member bears no official evidentiary burden in
the request.252 Consequently, almost any business in the United
States could be selected for challenge inspection without proper jus-
tification. A requesting State Party member may be more interested
in obtaining a Host State Party member’s confidential business or
trade secrets than ensuring Treaty compliance.253 Challenge inspec-
tions are the type of random, limitless, and arbitrary administrative
searches the Supreme Court opposed in Donovan.254
Third, the Treaty procedure does not provide an adequate consti-
tutional substitute for a warrant. Non-related private businesses are
not required to be notified that their use of certain chemicals makes
them vulnerable to possible inspection by foreign officials. Unlike the
                                                                                                                   
In practice, however, the subjective focus of close regulation is problematic. .
. . [T]he subjective focus might give short shrift to an objective factor—such as
a truly compelling governmental interest—that might support warrantless in-
spections of industries that are not so closely regulated. Consequently, the
close regulation standard may set a threshold that is too high for the Treaty’s
verification regime to meet.
Id.
249. See Tanzman, supra note 121, at 53.
250. Such warrantless searches, without probable cause and judicial scrutiny, have
been compared to the searches conducted by British soldiers before the founding of the
Constitution. “Ad hoc on-site inspections resemble the general warrants that the King of
England relied upon to search the businesses of colonists before the Revolutionary War. It
was the reaction to such warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 54
n.199.
251. See supra Part II.A.2.
252. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X,
¶¶ 4-6, at 428-29.
253. See Pat Griffith, supra note 36 (describing the fears of Treaty opponents that
teams of international inspectors will burst into U.S. firms without notification in an at-
tempt to capture trade secrets).
254. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981).
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requirements of Burger, the challenge inspections are not limited to
normal business hours; they may proceed continuously for almost
four days.255 Also, the Treaty and Implementation Act do not proce-
durally limit the scope of the inspection, as did the statute in ques-
tion in Burger. In contrast to a comprehensive and detailed inspec-
tion regime, the Treaty uses broad and unconfined language to de-
scribe the bounds of this highly intrusive verification process. The
Treaty places full discretion in the hands of the domestic officials
and international inspectors conducting the search.
Finally, the scope of the Treaty’s challenge inspections is not lim-
ited to a specific or single industry, but instead crosses industry
lines. Because the verification mechanism is designed to prevent the
unauthorized manufacturing and stockpiling of chemical weapons, it
permits searches of all industries that produce or use the chemical
agents related to possible weapons. For instance, the exception
would have to include the pen factories and detergent manufacturers
previously mentioned because they also use Schedule Two, Schedule
Three, and other proscribed chemicals.256 This contradicts the logical
underpinning of the current PRI exception. In Donovan, the regula-
tion narrowly targeted a single, specific industry.257 The Court justi-
fied its opinion on the basis that the regulation was limited in nature
and the property owners were subjectively aware of the regulations
permitting the governmental intrusion.258 Further, while the Su-
preme Court may have granted Congress the power to regulate more
industries under its expansion of the PRI exception, the Court re-
quired that such regulations take place on an industry-by-industry
basis.259 If the PRI exception were upheld to justify such intensive
warrantless administrative searches across industry lines, the ex-
ception would swallow the Camara rule. No business would be left
with a reasonable expectation of privacy from unwarranted govern-
mental inspection.
E.  The Special Needs Exception to the Administrative Search
Warrant Requirement
In recent years, the Supreme Court has carved a second exception
to the Camara administrative warrant requirement. A warrantless
administrative search may be justified if the reason for the lack of a
                                                                                                                   
255. See TREATY, supra note 21, Part X, §§ B-C, at 428-39.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 120-23.
257. See Donovan, 452 U.S. at 597.
258. See id. at 599-600.
259. See Gray, supra note 21, at 613, 618 (analyzing relevant case law limiting the
application of the PRI exception).
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warrant is declared a “special need.”260 A special need arises when
the government attempts to protect a substantial governmental in-
terest that extends beyond the needs of normal law enforcement.261
Examples of court-declared special needs include a high school prin-
cipal’s right to search a student’s purse262 and an employer’s right to
require employee blood and urine drug testing.263
The Supreme Court created the special needs exception to the
administrative warrant requirement in New Jersey v. T.L.O .264 The
Court upheld a public school principal’s right to search a student’s
purse after the student was caught violating the school’s no smoking
rule.265 The Court found that a special need justified the warrantless
search because of the difficulty in maintaining discipline in public
schools and the significant social impacts created by increasing lev-
els of violence and drug use.266 The Court applied a reasonableness
test that considered all of the circumstances and balanced the gov-
ernmental interest and nature of the search against the intrusion of
the individual’s privacy right.267
According to the T.L.O. Court, for a warrantless administrative
search to be justified as a special need, it must meet three criteria.268
First, the government must prove that a strong governmental inter-
est exists beyond the need of normal law enforcement procedures.269
Second, the necessity of the search must make both the warrant and
probable cause requirements impractical.270 Third, the regulatory
scheme must protect the target from arbitrary or unjustified inva-
sions.271 In applying these protections, courts require proof of rea-
sonable and articulable grounds to suspect that the search will un-
cover evidence of misconduct.272
                                                                                                                   
260. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
261. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; Skinner v. Railway Lab. Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 619-20 (1989); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Wasser-
strom, supra note 150, at 127-29 (explaining the rationale behind the special needs excep-
tion).
262. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353.
263. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34.
264. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
265. See id. at 347-48.
266. See id. at 339-40.
267. See id. at 341. The Court will, at times, ease both the warrant and probable cause
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment when it is impractical for an official to obtain a
warrant or to establish probable cause. See id.
268. See id. at 340-43; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-60
(1995).
269. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339-40.
270. See id. at 340.
271. See id. at 342-43.
272. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (relying upon the holding of
T.L.O.).
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More recently, the Supreme Court handed down two decisions to
help clarify the special needs exception. In Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives’ Association ,273 the Court reaffirmed its holding that once
the government proves that a special need is involved, courts should
balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practi-
cality of the warrant requirement.274 In applying the balancing test,
the Skinner Court concluded that the safety of the railways and their
history of accidents outweighed the minimal privacy intrusion of a
blood and urine testing program that was limited in scope, gave no
discretion to the field officials, and was known by all employees.275
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab ,276 the Court
upheld a similar drug testing program, finding that the government
interest in deterring drug use by individuals eligible for sensitive
positions in the customs service outweighed the employees’ privacy
interests against mandatory urine tests.277 In short, the Court held
that in special cases an administrative search of a person is permis-
sible without individualized suspicion.
Thus, Skinner and Van Raab evidence the Supreme Court’s ex-
pansion of the special needs exception to permit warrantless
searches based merely on a reasonable suspicion rather than on
probable cause. In so doing, the Court seemingly blurred the line be-
tween what is, and what is not, a “special need.” The Court’s rulings
leave undecided the scope of the special needs exception, which ap-
pears to be defined by the particular factual circumstances in any
given case, rather than by a more precise legal standard or per se
rule.
National Authority officials might attempt to justify warrantless
challenge inspections as a special needs exception to the adminis-
trative warrant requirement. The National Authority will likely ar-
gue that upholding the Treaty is a special need because controlling
the proliferation and potential use of chemical weapons is a strong
governmental interest. Since the challenge inspections will most
likely be coordinated by the Department of Justice and conducted by
foreign inspectors, the search will probably be beyond the scope of
normal law enforcement. Also, the administrative warrant require-
ment is impractical given the structure of the verification regime.278
Finally, the reasonableness of the balancing test would favor uphold-
ing the Treaty requirements over an individual’s business or resi-
                                                                                                                   
273. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
274. See id. at 619.
275. See id. at 622.
276. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
277. See id. at 679.
278. See supra Part III.C.
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dential privacy interests when considering the potential effects that
might result from a breakdown of the Treaty.
However, several counter-arguments prevent the special needs
exception from authorizing challenge inspections without a warrant
or pre-judicial scrutiny. First, the special needs exception only allows
searches of people or their personal possessions.279 Courts have never
allowed the special needs exception to subject homes or businesses to
warrantless administrative searches. This would be an incredible
expansion of the current doctrine given the level of intrusion allowed
by challenge inspections and the fact that their scope could reach
inside nearly every facility in the United States. Furthermore, any
extension of the current doctrine would require litigation and an ex-
press judicial change, at which point the Treaty might have already
been violated by the delay of the inspection.280
Second, the practicality standard to justify the lessening of the
traditional administrative warrant cannot be satisfied. The Treaty
mandates that the Host State Party member has between twenty-
four and 108 hours to provide the inspectors with the required access
to the chosen facility.281 Thus, the Department of Justice would have
up to four-and-one-half days to apply for an administrative warrant
from a federal judge. Therefore, the warrant process is not impracti-
cal to meet the needs of the Treaty.282 Additionally, the Implementa-
tion Act requires that the National Authority try to obtain an admin-
istrative warrant.283 Thus, to argue a special needs exception exists,
the Department of Justice will have to be denied an administrative
warrant from a federal magistrate, and then contend that the search
involves a special need.
                                                                                                                   
279. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-67; New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347-48 (1985).
280. This conclusion does not assume the potential unconstitutionality of the Imple-
mentation Act’s ban on the lower courts’ ability to issue injunctive relief. At best, the ban
is still subject to constitutional scrutiny to the extent that a federal court will need to
consider the legitimacy of section 406 of the Implementation Act. See infra Part IV.
281. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, §
B, at 428-34.
282. The problem for the Department of Justice is that it is unlikely that a judge will
issue an administrative warrant for a challenge inspection given the intrusive nature of
the search. See infra Part III.C. The only reason the warrant requirement may be
“impractical” is because the Department of Justice officials will likely lack sufficient in-
formation to meet the minimum standards required by the Fourth Amendment. See Gray,
supra note 21, at 604-05 (explaining that the importance of the Treaty may not justify ig-
noring the impracticality standard of the special needs exception).
For the Treaty to be valid, it must not only be important, but it must also be legitimate
under the Constitution. Gray writes, “[T]he ‘special needs’ test perhaps passes too quickly
by the claim of impracticality; the correspondence between practicality and constitutional-
ity may be tenuous. Arguably, the need must be more than substantial; it must also be
legitimate.” Id. at 605 n.233.
283. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406.
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Further, the Treaty and Implementation Act do not protect the
target facility from arbitrary inspections. Challenge inspections are
easy for a State Party member to request, and are unlikely to be re-
jected by the Technical-Secretariat.284 The Treaty only requires that
the requesting State Party member provide nominal information.
However, this level of information is insufficient to justify a search
under the Fourth Amendment. The regulatory scheme does not ade-
quately prevent arbitrary selection of facilities for challenge inspec-
tions, and thus cannot meet the protections demanded by the special
needs exception.
Finally, the application of the factors used in the Skinner balanc-
ing test leads to the conclusion that the warrantless challenge in-
spection search is unreasonable. When the Skinner Court upheld the
blood and urine testing of railroad employees, it stated that the in-
dividual’s privacy interests were lessened because the regulation
limited the discretion of the officials, was narrow in scope, and was
known to all of the employees.285 Conversely, challenge inspections
may be authorized against any facility at any time. The verification
regime also allows the inspectors a nearly unlimited amount of dis-
cretion.286 Private individuals and businesses deserve protection of
the strong privacy interest.
F.  A Possible Reformulation of the Pervasively Regulated Industry
Exception
One commentator, David G. Gray, has suggested that the uncon-
stitutionality of challenge inspections may be avoided by a reformu-
lation of the PRI exception to include a “special needs” reasonable-
ness balancing test to allow warrantless administrative searches.287
The proposed reformulated “PRI-special needs hybrid exception”
(Hybrid Exception) would utilize a four part test to determine if a
particular search requires an administrative warrant. The first two
parts of the test involve threshold questions. First, is there a special
need involved? A special need must exist to justify the lack of a war-
rant.288 Second, does the individual or business enjoy a decreased ex-
                                                                                                                   
284. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
285. See Skinner v. Railway Lab. Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989).
286. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, §
C, at 434-38.
287. See Gray, supra note 21, at 650-55 (explaining how his proposed reformulated
pervasively regulated exception would alleviate the constitutional problems that arise
from challenge inspections).
288. Gray argued that this special need analysis should be identical to the special
need analysis described in Part III.E. See id. at 645. Gray also indicated that the special
needs Hybrid Exception search may cross industry lines because it would be unwise to
hinder Congress in its efforts to address social problems. See id.
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pectation of privacy?289 The third and fourth parts of the Hybrid Ex-
ception involve more substantive concerns. The third part uses the
special needs balancing test to weigh the governmental interest
against the privacy intrusion.290 The fourth part demands that a con-
stitutionally adequate substitute be required in the regulation to
protect the individual.291
Gray argues that the proposed Hybrid Exception test should al-
low warrantless administrative searches of non-Treaty-related pri-
vate businesses.292 Upholding Treaty obligations would qualify as a
special need because of the substantial governmental interest in
preventing the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. Gray con-
tends that these non-related private businesses enjoy a limited pri-
vacy interest because of the dangers the Treaty attempts to allevi-
ate.293 Because intrusive verification is needed to enforce the Treaty,
Gray justifies reducing the privacy expectation of the individual
property owners.294 Finally, Gray argues that the inspection process
was not arbitrary because the slight burden of suspicion and the ra-
tionality of resource management dictate that constraints and safe-
guards exist.295
However, several obstacles prevent Gray’s Hybrid Exception from
solving the constitutional problems raised by the challenge inspec-
tions of private, unrelated businesses. First, the creation of a Hybrid
Exception would require an affirmative act of Fourth Amendment
interpretation by a court. However, no such mechanism was offered
                                                                                                                   
289. Gray does not propose whether this expectation of privacy should be subjective or
objective. See id. However, the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is at the cen-
ter of the Supreme Court’s decisions in both Donovan and Burger. See Donovan v. Dewey
452 U.S. 594 (1981); New York v. Burger 482 U.S. 691 (1987). If Gray suggests modifying
the expectation of privacy standard to an objective view, he neither explains how this will
effect the previous PRI cases, nor justifies why an objective expectation of privacy is a bet-
ter standard.
290. See supra Part III.E (discussing the special needs exception).
291. See Gray, supra note 21, at 650. The constitutionally adequate substitute is iden-
tical to the third procedural prong of the Burger test. See id. For a discussion of the third
prong of the Burger test, see Part II.D.1. The constitutionally adequate substitute relies
on the logic of the Donovan decision and applies two criteria: (1) whether the regulation
sufficiently limits the discretion of the inspector, and (2) whether the inspection scheme is
sufficiently comprehensive and predictable so that the property owner is constructively
notified of the inspection. See Gray, supra note 21, at 650.
292. Gray assumes that a challenge inspection of a home would be extreme and re-
quire a warrant. However, he argues that any facility capable of producing a significant
quantity of chemical weapons would be larger than a home and subject to the Hybrid Ex-
ception. See Gray, supra note 21, at 653-54.
293. Gray argues that there are three ways a business may have a reduced expecta-
tion of privacy: (1) a history or tradition of regulation, (2) an inherent or immediate threat
to health or safety, or (3) consent. See id. at 645-48.
294. Gray’s full argument follows: “A limited privacy interest inheres in non-
residential property under the best of circumstances; the danger countered by the Treaty
reduces the legitimate privacy expectations still further.” Id. at 655.
295. See id.
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to implement these new standards.296 Once a Treaty challenge in-
spection reaches the litigation stage in a district court, the United
States may have already delayed the inspection team and violated
its obligations under the Treaty.297
Second, a challenge inspection of a private, unrelated business
would fail the Hybrid Exception. Nothing in the theory explains why
the targeted business has a decreased expectation of privacy to meet
the second part of the exception. Since there is no history or tradition
of government regulation of such broad scope across so many indus-
tries, the focus of the test must be on the inherent threat to safety.298
Again, Gray gives no analysis as to why the importance of the
Treaty’s protection reduces the privacy expectation of these unre-
lated private businesses. As previously mentioned, these industries
have not been warned or put on notice that they are subject to
searches by teams of international inspectors.299 Therefore, the exis-
tence of the Treaty regulations themselves fails to provide construc-
tive notice of the potential for a warrantless search.
Moreover, Gray’s rationale suggests that these individuals de-
serve a lessened expectation of privacy because of the important so-
cietal benefits derived from the Treaty.300 This logic, however, is cir-
cular. It allows the legislative intent behind the Treaty regulations
to dictate the warrant requirement for challenge inspections in open
disregard of constitutionally protected Fourth Amendment rights.
Application of the Hybrid Exception would make the Fourth
Amendment nothing more than a hollow guarantee of the individual
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Gray does not offer a constitutionally adequate substitute to pro-
tect the individual from arbitrary inspections. The fact that the Na-
tional Authority informs a business or homeowner that their prop-
erty will be intensely searched for the next five days does not meet
the advance notice requirement set forth in Donovan or Burger.301
                                                                                                                   
296. See id.
297. The Implementation Act attempts to prevent this delay by banning judicial
remedies before the search occurs. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(c).
298. See supra Part III.D.2.
299. See supra Part III.D.2.
300. “While it seems likely that the inspections are too infrequent to diminish greatly
the subjective privacy expectations of the owners of the target plants, the very danger that
this Treaty combats extends so far as to reshape the objective expectation of privacy ac-
corded the owners by society.” Gray, supra note 21, at 651-52.
However, this argument concedes that there is no decrease in the subjective expectation
of privacy, and Gray never proposes an absolute shift to allow objective privacy viewpoints
to govern the test. Furthermore, a mechanism or justification for shifting the current Su-
preme Court reliance on the subjective expectation of privacy is not explained in Gray’s
article.
301. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 601-03 (1981).
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The Treaty also does not limit the scope or intensity of the search,
but instead leaves such decisions to the discretion of the inspectors
or to the objections of the Host State Party member.
Gray concedes that the Treaty verification regime cannot tolerate
blind spots larger than a home.302 However, it is doubtful that the
Hybrid Exception can alleviate the constitutional concerns raised by
the challenge inspection of a private, non-related business. Gray
gives no justifiable explanation as to how two distinctly established
and applied juridical doctrines may be extended and merged without
initial considerations by the courts. Also lacking is how the Hybrid
Exception can be reformulated before a violation of the Treaty oc-
curs. Finally, the Treaty fails to meet the requirements of its appli-
cation to the Hybrid Exception because there is neither a decreased
expectation of privacy, nor a constitutionally adequate substitute to
protect the privacy interests of the targeted owner.
G.  National Security Exception
Government officials might rely on a national security exception
to justify a warrantless search for challenge inspections. Generally,
courts are deferential to cases involving issues of national security.303
This is especially true when both elected branches are acting in con-
cert.304 However, such case law does not necessarily mean that courts
concede all matters concerning national security to the government.
On the contrary, courts continue to apply constitutional safeguards
to issues of national security, especially when individual rights are
at stake.305 The Constitution demands that legislative and executive
actions undertaken in the name of national security still be bound by
Fourth Amendment protections.306
More significantly, the Supreme Court has never announced a
national security exception to the warrant requirement.307 In Katz,
the Court expressly reserved its judgment on the issue of whether a
warrant should be required before government could be permitted to
conduct electronic surveillance for national security purposes.308 The
                                                                                                                   
302. See Gray, supra note 21, at 652.
303. See Koplow, supra note 72, at 325.
304. See id.
305. See id. at 326.
306. See id. at 461 n.213.
The Constitution . . . was written so as to strike a balance between the protec-
tion of political freedom and protection of national security interests. To guar-
antee political freedom, our forefathers agreed to take certain risks which are
inherent in a free democracy. It is unthinkable that we should now be required
to sacrifice those freedoms in order to defend them.
Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424, 430 (C.D. Cal. 1971)).
307. See Gray, supra note 21, at 634.
308. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967).
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Supreme Court left this question open by rejecting the chance to rule
on the constitutionality of warrantless surveillance of domestic or-
ganizations by denying writs of certiorari to lower court cases.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to ruling on a national
security exception was in 1976 when it denied a writ of certiorari to
review the decision of a federal court of appeals decision in Zweibon
v. Mitchell.309 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had
held that the government needed a Camara-style warrant before
they could electronically wiretap a domestic organization, even
though the wiretaps were authorized by the President.310 The Zwei-
bon ruling required the government to seek an administrative war-
rant because the warrant requirement did not frustrate the govern-
mental purposes behind the search.311
Even though the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the
legitimacy of a national security exception, several lower courts have
addressed the issue. Currently, the circuit courts are split as to the
permissibility of warrantless searches based on national security
concerns. For example, in United States v. United States District
Court,312 the Supreme Court considered a Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision against allowing national security interests to trump
civil liberties.313 The Sixth Circuit had held that the government is
required to obtain a warrant to conduct surveillance deemed neces-
sary to protect the country from domestic organizations’ attempts to
subvert the existing structure of government.314 The Supreme Court
affirmed the appellate court’s opinion, deciding that the govern-
ment’s national security interest was insufficient to justify the sub-
version of constitutionally guaranteed individual rights.315
Conversely, other circuit courts have held warrantless searches
justified by national security concerns. For example, in United States
v. Brown,316 the Fifth Circuit held that the President may authorize
warrantless wiretaps to gather foreign intelligence.317 Additionally,
in United States v. Butenko ,318 the Third Circuit applied a reason-
ableness standard to searches based on national security, and de-
                                                                                                                   
309. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
310. See id. at 614 (relying on Camara to require a warrant prior to the installation of
the wiretap).
311. See id. at 669.
312. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
313. See id.
314. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 444 F. 2d 651, 667 (6th Cir. 1971),
aff’d, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
315. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 323-24 (1972); see also
Eggert, supra note 148, at 632-33 (discussing the scope of warrant requirement for non-
criminal searches).
316. 484 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
317. See id. at 426.
318. 494 F.2d 593 (3rd Cir.).
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termined that not all of these searches require prior judicial ap-
proval.319
Even the circuit court opinions that seem to allow a warrantless
national security search have a limited scope. The warrantless
search appears to be limited to electronic intelligence gathering
against foreign groups.320 Furthermore, the searches cannot be con-
ducted against non-foreign powers or non-foreign agents, and
probably require presidential authorization.321
Government officials may assert that Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence has developed, or should develop, a national security ex-
ception permitting them additional latitude to implement and en-
force international treaty obligations. This argument suggests that
the importance of preserving international agreements, especially
multinational arms control treaties, justifies a national security ex-
ception to the traditional warrant requirement.
However, several distinctions exist between the currently recog-
nized but limited form of the national security exception and its
possible application to the Treaty. First, the Treaty permits inspec-
tions of private businesses and homes which are only tangentially
related to Treaty objectives.322 This is in sharp contrast to the circuit
court opinions that limit the scope of the national security exception
to surveillance of foreign organizations or their agents.323
Second, the government has never used the national security ex-
ception to justify a physical search of any facility. Instead, the ex-
ception has been limited to justify electronic intelligence gather-
ing.324 Given the current state of the extremely narrow national se-
curity exception, no government official could reasonably rely on it
as an acceptable means to avoid obtaining a warrant before conduct-
ing a challenge inspection. Rather, the expansion of the national se-
curity exception would likely entail litigation of the issues in front of
a neutral and detached magistrate—and would therefore run the
risk of delaying the international inspectorate’s access to the facility.
The extension of a national security exception to justify warrant-
less administrative searches would undermine the foundation of the
Constitution. Overlooking constitutional requirements simply be-
                                                                                                                   
319. See id. at 608; see also United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913
(4th Cir. 1980) (holding that courts do not need to require a warrant every time the ex-
ecutive branch conducts foreign surveillance of foreign powers); see also United States v.
Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that foreign security wire taps are a rec-
ognized exception to the general warrant requirement).
320. See Koplow, supra note 140, at 460 (synthesizing the holdings of Truong Dinh
Hung, Buck, Butenko, and Brown); see also Eggert, supra note 148, at 627-28.
321. See Eggert, supra note 148, at 627-28.
322. See supra Part II.A. (discussing the scope of challenge inspections).
323. See cases cited supra notes 315, 319.
324. See cases cited supra notes 315, 319.
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cause the government has a strong interest at stake is wrong, espe-
cially when the value of our individually protected constitutional
rights conflict with an important governmental concern. It is in
times of conflict when the constitutional dedication to the protection
of individual rights should prevail over the creation of broad-based
and unbounded exceptions to those safeguards. As one court so ele-
gantly noted: “The Court has not denied the reality of dangers from
foreign or internal conflicts. Rather, it has recognized the need to re-
spect constitutional requirements even in troubled times.”325
Developing a national security exception would also destroy the
traditional notion of separation of powers established by the Consti-
tution. A national security exception would remove judicial oversight
when it is most desperately needed—at times when individual rights
are at stake. The constitutional warrant requirement exists to help
contain the power of the government to order such searches by re-
quiring a detached and neutral magistrate to review and, if needed,
protect the rights of the individuals being searched. It is the courts’
ultimate duty to act as a bulwark against such encroachments, and
that obligation should not be abandoned simply because the execu-
tive and legislature have found a “national security” need.326 The Su-
preme Court warned against allowing such encroachments into in-
dividual rights when it wrote:
It may be that . . .[this search and seizure] is the obnoxious thing
in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and uncon-
stitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by
silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of proce-
dure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that consti-
tutional provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the
right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.327
Finally, government could create a national security exception to
justify any governmental intrusion. To justify a warrantless search,
the executive need only claim a national security interest and the
courts’ precedent would allow the search to take place. Courts should
never open such a Pandora’s box; once open, it will be nearly impos-
sible to shut.
                                                                                                                   
325. Gray, supra note 21, at 637 n.425 (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192,
1200-01 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
326. See id. at 637.
327. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
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IV.  THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION ACT’S
PROHIBITION OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Subsection 406(C) of the Implementation Act prohibits courts
from issuing injunctions relating to warrants or other orders limiting
the ability of the Technical Secretariat to conduct inspections, or the
U.S. Government to facilitate them.328 By this mandate, Congress in-
tended to enact a procedural jurisdictional bar against a court’s
ability to issue injunctive relief.329 Yet, the Implementation Act does
not provide an explicit alternative remedy of redress for a plaintiff
who is harmed by an unconstitutional challenge inspection.
The purpose behind the legislative ban on injunctive relief is
fairly obvious. If plaintiffs are permitted the opportunity to enjoin
challenge inspections, such suits could delay, or even completely
prevent, government officials’ and foreign inspectors’ access to the
challenge site. The issuance of an injunction, or the delay associated
with such an appeal, could cause the United States to inadvertently
abrogate its Treaty verification obligations.
If the Implementation Act is left intact, private individuals and
businesses will be unable to seek judicial relief to protect both their
privacy interests and confidential business information from chal-
lenge searches. Because the Implementation Act strips the courts of
their ability to provide an appropriate remedy and also fails to pro-
vide a substitute remedy, the Implementation Act fails to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.330
In addition, any plaintiff knowing a challenge inspection is immi-
nent and seeking injunctive relief before it occurs could pose the ad-
judicating court with a Hobbesian choice. Before dismissing the
plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief, the court would inevitably be
required to consider the constitutionality of the Implementation
Act’s ban on the plaintiff’s right to request this remedy. If the court
determines that Congress’s jurisdictional prohibition against in-
junctive relief is valid, the court will be forced to dismiss the suit and
the plaintiff will be left without a prospective remedy. On the other
hand, if the court determines that Congress’s removal of injunctive
jurisdiction is improper, it will be forced to strike down the Imple-
mentation Act as unconstitutional.
                                                                                                                   
328. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(c); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 131-35 (noting the Implementation Act’s recognition that if such injunctions
were allowed, the United States might inadvertently violate its Treaty obligations).
329. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(c).
330. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing injunctions as the only appropriate remedy for
the protection of constitutional rights threatened by the Implementation Act).
1998]             CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 619
A.  The Lack of Precedent Justifying a Ban on Injunctive Relief
The text of the Implementation Act cites what the drafters and
several commentators consider to be long-standing legal precedent in
support of Congress’s power to prevent the courts from issuing in-
junctive relief.331 However, a closer analysis of this precedent leads to
the conclusion that in cases where injunctive relief is the only ap-
propriate remedy by which the courts can fulfill their responsibility
to protect individual constitutional rights, Congress may not strip
the courts of this power.
1.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act
The Implementation Act explicitly relies on the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,332 an anti-injunction law, as an example of domestic legislation
through which Congress constitutionally limited the availability of
injunctive relief.333 Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court struck down state laws forbidding remedies that enforced
“yellow dog contracts”—contracts in which employees agree not to
join labor unions.334 The Norris-LaGuardia Act provided that no fed-
eral court has jurisdiction to issue an injunction to enforce yellow
dog contracts335 and was enacted because the conservative Court had
struck down state legislation prohibiting these contracts and allow-
ing labor strikes.336
In Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co .,337 the Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s limitations on the courts’
ability to grant injunctions for labor disputes.338 The Court upheld
this section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and stated, “There can be
no question of the power of Congress thus to define and limit the ju-
risdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.”339
In order for supporters of the Implementation Act to rely on the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Lauf must stand for the proposition that
                                                                                                                   
331. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(c) (discussing the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1994); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
and Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948)).
332. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1994).
333. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(c).
334. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 330 (1921) (suggesting that it would be
a violation of due process for a state not to grant injunctive relief to protect a property
owner if the state provides no other alternative protection); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S.
1, 18 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 171 (1908).
335. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 107 (1994).
336. See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1193 n.376 (1989); see also Paula L. McDonald, Note, Judicial Inter-
pretation of Collective Bargaining Agreement: The Danger Inherent in the Determination of
Arbitrabililty, 1983 DUKE L.J. 848, 850-51 (1983).
337. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
338. See id. at 329.
339. Id. at 330.
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Congress may strip the courts of jurisdiction to grant injunctive re-
lief regardless of the fact that injunctive relief is the only available
remedy to prevent the violation of a constitutional right. But while
the language of Lauf may seem to suggest that Congress has such
power, there are numerous reasons to believe that this legislative
authority lacks a constitutional foundation.
First, a careful reading of Lauf demonstrates that the Supreme
Court skirted the issue of whether Congress’s power to control the
jurisdiction of inferior courts may supersede the protection of consti-
tutional rights.340 Section 107 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act actually
permits lower courts to grant injunctive relief if certain strict stan-
dards are met.341 Among these standards is the requirement that the
plaintiff prove that, absent this special form of court intervention, a
substantial and irreparable injury will result.342 The Norris-
LaGuardia Act leaves intact other state and federal remedies besides
injunctions and does not mandate a complete ban of injunctive re-
lief.343 Thus, the validity of the Norris-LaGuardia Act’s limitation on
injunctive relief rests upon Congress’s decision to provide other
remedies unless injunctive relief is constitutionally required.
Congress may limit the judiciary’s authority to issue injunctions
in two ways. Congress may either withdraw the courts’ jurisdiction
to grant injunctions, or Congress may heighten the standards an
individual is required to meet in order to receive an injunction. Both
congressional acts would limit an individual’s ability to avoid a sub-
stantive constitutional rights violation through the protective cloak
of an injunction. However, the Constitution limits Congress’s
authority to restrict an individual’s substantive constitutional pro-
tections.344 Congress may not impede or deny an individual injunc-
tive relief when such relief is required to protect a constitutional
right. In this sense, the withdrawal of a court’s jurisdiction to issue
an injunction enforcing labor contracts is identical to a legislative
heightening of the standard of proof required before a court could is-
sue an injunction. Both forms of congressional action, if designed
with the intent of preventing a plaintiff from obtaining prospective
                                                                                                                   
340. See Gordon G. Young, A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Con-
gress’s Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132,
170 (1995).
341. See 29 U.S.C. § 107(a)-(e) (1994).
342. Section 107 permits a court to issue an injunction if: (1) unlawful acts have been
threatened, will be or have been committed and will continue; (2) substantial and irrepa-
rable injury will result; (3) greater injury will result to complainant by denial of relief
than to defendants by granting [relief]; (4) there is no adequate remedy at law; and (5) the
public officers charged with protecting complainant are unwilling or unable to do so. See
id.
343. See id.
344. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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relief, permit preventable violations of individual constitutional
rights. Procedural limitations exist to protect a court’s jurisdiction
when congressional limitations impact an individual’s substantive
rights. These procedural limitations are subject to constitutional
scrutiny. “Lauf contains no holding permitting jurisdictional powers
to trump constitutional claims. . . .”345
Second, there is good reason to believe that by the time the Lauf
court considered the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the justices no longer
felt bound by their previous Lochner-era decisions.346 With Lochner
and its progeny decisions, the Court chose to protect businesses’
rights, including the right to remain unconstrained by certain types
of governmental regulation and to receive an injunction to effectuate
this right.347 These were the same rights asserted by the plaintiffs in
Lauf.348 However, by 1938 the Court had already begun to repudiate
its protection of substantive economic rights.349 The Lauf justices, in
determining the constitutionality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, may
not have considered the plaintiffs’ rights deserving of constitutional
protection through the issuance of an injunction. Instead, the jus-
tices believed that the plaintiffs’ economic rights could be remedied
through alternative federal and state means.350
Finally, the Norris-LaGuardia Act created a poor standard upon
which to base a determination of when a substantive right deserves
protection by the issuance of an injunction. The Norris-LaGuardia
Act requires a plaintiff to prove “That as to each item of relief
granted greater injury will be inflicted upon [the] complainant by the
denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting
of relief.”351
This balancing test shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that enforcement of yellow dog contracts outweighs the
benefit of avoiding labor strikes and an industry-wide impediment to
industrial production. However, if such a standard were applied to
the Implementation Act, it would force private individuals and busi-
nesspersons to prove that their privacy or interests outweigh the po-
tential benefit of maintaining the Treaty. Given the design of the
balancing test in this instance, it would seem impossible for any
plaintiff to receive an injunction to protect his or her rights against
                                                                                                                   
345. Young, supra note 340, at 170.
346. See id. at 176.
347. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (striking down a New York law
limiting the hours that bakers could work to 10 hours a day and 60 hours a week).
348. See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 326 (1938).
349. See Young, supra note 340, at 176-78.
350. Unlike the alleged substantive economic rights in Lochner and Lauf, plaintiffs
contesting a Treaty challenge inspection seek protection of a well-established Fourth
Amendment right. See supra Part III.B.
351. 29 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1994).
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an illegal search. While the Lauf Court held the Norris-LaGuardia
Act constitutional in part because it allowed the issuance of injunc-
tions under limited circumstances,352 application of this same balanc-
ing test to the Implementation Act would appear to have the same
effect as a complete ban on injunctive relief. On the face of the stat-
ute, plaintiffs would be at a tremendous disadvantage in attempting
to prove that their individual privacy interests outweigh the benefits
of the Treaty.
2.  Yakus v. United States
In 1942, Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control Act.353 As
part of the Act, Congress denied both federal and state courts juris-
diction to consider the constitutionality of price regulations, and pre-
vented the courts from enjoining enforcement of the Act’s regula-
tions.354 Attacks on the validity of the Act were limited to a newly
created Emergency Court of Appeals whose decision could only be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.355
In Yakus v. United States ,356 the Court considered a district
court’s ruling under the Emergency Price Control Act. The district
court had refused to consider Yakus’s claim that the Emergency
Price Control Act was unconstitutional and had convicted him of
violations of price control regulations covered by the Act.357 The Su-
preme Court affirmed the conviction and held that Yakus should
have challenged the validity of the Act in the newly created Emer-
gency Court of Appeals.358 In so doing, the Supreme Court empha-
sized Congress’s ability to deny the district court’s jurisdiction to
consider Yakus’s defense so long as Congress provided Yakus with
an adequate forum in which to make his appeal.359
Despite its practical result in affirming Yakus’s conviction, the
Court’s decision stands for the proposition that Congress cannot
limit a lower court’s jurisdiction to enter pleas for the protection of a
constitutional right without the provision of an adequate remedial
substitute. The implementing legislation provides no alternative and
adequate substitute forum where potential plaintiffs may seek pro-
tection of their Fourth Amendment rights before an allegedly uncon-
stitutional search commences.
                                                                                                                   
352. See Lauf, 303 U.S. at 330.
353. Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (1942), repealed by Act of July 25, 1946, ch. 671,
60 Stat. 664.
354. See id. § 204(d), 56 Stat. at 32-33.
355. See id.
356. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
357. See id. at 418.
358. See id.
359. See id. at 429.
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3.  Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938360 mandated overtime pay
for employees working over forty hours per week. The Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947361 defined the “work week” of miners so as not to
include the time these laborers spent traveling underground to and
from the mineface, as well as other preparation time involved in
their work.362 The Portal-to-Portal Act also limited federal court ju-
risdiction against hearing any suit for overtime pay arising from this
legislative definition of a miner’s work week.363
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the Portal-to-Portal
Act in Battaglia v. General Motors Corp .364 However, the Second Cir-
cuit also held that Congress’s power to regulate jurisdiction of the in-
ferior federal courts is subject to compliance with the requirements
of the Fifth Amendment.365 The Court ruled that Congress’s power to
withdraw lower court jurisdiction to consider certain cases is subject
to the same constitutional limitations on Congress’s substantive
power to eliminate employer liability for accrued overtime pay.366 In
other words, Battaglia indirectly stands for the principle that Con-
gress’s authority to limit federal court jurisdiction is bound by the
requirement that an alternative appropriate remedy be supplied to
protect the jeopardized constitutional right.367
Application of the Battaglia holding to the Implementation Act
once again demonstrates that Congress lacks the authority to with-
draw injunctive relief when its failure to provide an appropriate sub-
stitute remedy threatens the violation of a well-established Fourth
Amendment right.
B.  Injunctions Are the Only Appropriate Remedy
The precedent of cases mentioned above dictates Congress’s obli-
gation to provide an adequate remedy for the protection of constitu-
tional rights. To do otherwise subverts the judiciary’s obligation to
prevent incipient violations of these rights. These cases also suggest
that Congress’s ability to prohibit injunctive relief, like its ability to
control jurisdictional issues, is limited by its effect on substantive
                                                                                                                   
360. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
361. See id. §§ 254-56; see also Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 255-
56 (2d Cir. 1948).
362. See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (1994).
363. See id. § 252(d).
364. 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948).
365. See id. at 272.
366. See id. at 272-73.
367. See id. at 273 (“Should Congress undertake to withdraw from the courts jurisdic-
tion to consider and determine pure questions of ownership or title to property unaffected
by constitutional provisions, a more serious question would be presented, but we are not
confronted here with such a case.”).
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rights—limitations imposed by the Constitution. There can be only
one reasonable conclusion drawn from the judicial precedent de-
scribed above: Congress cannot withdraw jurisdiction to issue any
constitutionally required remedy.
Naturally, this conclusion seems to beg the question: When is a
remedy constitutionally required such that congressional withdrawal
of lower court jurisdiction to grant that remedy should be struck
down as unconstitutional? In answering this query, the courts
should consider two factors: whether the remedy to be prohibited is
an appropriate mechanism by which to redress the plaintiff’s injuries
and whether appropriate alternative remedies exist.368
1.  Injunctive Relief Is an Appropriate Remedy
Historically, injunctions have been considered adequate and ap-
propriate remedies in cases involving litigation of constitutional
violations.369 This is especially true when an award of monetary
damages is unsuitable to redress the individual’s loss from the con-
stitutional violation.370 Injunctions have also been used by courts as
an appropriate remedy to prevent governmental disclosure of confi-
dential business information and trade secrets.371 There can be no
doubt that injunctions are an appropriate remedy by which to pro-
tect individuals from foreseen, yet avoidable, constitutional viola-
tions.
In the case of challenge inspections, injunctive relief is an appro-
priate remedy. The Treaty’s verification regime obligates the direc-
tor-general to inform the Host State Party member of the impending
search and the facility to be inspected.372 It is logical to assume that
the United States National Authority will inform the private indi-
vidual or business targeted for challenge inspection. The National
Authority will either ask the property owner for consent to search, or
at a minimum, inform the property owner to prepare the facility for
the forthcoming inspection. This notice would provide the property
owner with time, albeit limited, to seek judicial intervention to pre-
                                                                                                                   
368. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’
Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 85
(1981).
369. See Tanzman, supra note 121, at 39 n.117 (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978)).
370. See id. (citing Daniel L. Rotenberg, Private Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs—
A Matter of Perspective, Priority, and Process, 14 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 77, 85 (1986)); infra
Part IV.B.2.
371. See id. (citing Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986)).
372. See TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part X, ¶
11, at 430 (requiring at least 12 hours of notice before the planned arrival of the inspec-
tion team at the point of entry).
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vent the inspection. If necessary, an injunction would be an appro-
priate measure by which to protect the constitutional interest of the
property owner before those interests could be trampled.
2.  No Appropriate Alternative Remedies Exist
The Implementation Act, while withdrawing lower court jurisdic-
tion to issue injunctive relief to prevent verification searches, offers
no explicit alternative remedy.373 Thus, the only option to redress a
plaintiff’s allegations of violations of protected privacy interests or
the release of confidential business information would be a post facto
suit for monetary damages. However, a suit for monetary damages
would not only be infeasible, but would also be unlikely to fully com-
pensate the plaintiff for the harms suffered.
A property owner is not likely to prevail in a suit for monetary
damages against a foreign State Party member because, unless the
foreign State Party member consents to be sued in a United States
court, that State Party member enjoys sovereign immunity.374 The
property owner would be forced to bring suit in the foreign jurisdic-
tion, and the suit would be governed by foreign law.375 The likelihood
of a domestic plaintiff prevailing against a foreign State Party in a
                                                                                                                   
373. See Implementation Act, supra note 24, § 406(c).
374. See Kellman et al., supra note 113, at 109 n.222 (citing Reynolds v. International
Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994)).
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act controls here. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391,
1441, 1602 (1994). Section 1604 states that “a foreign state shall be immune from the ju-
risdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States.” Id. § 1604. Section 1605
provides various exceptions to the general rule of immunity. See id. § 1605. One exception
is if a foreign state “has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication.” Id. §
1605(a)(1). However, a section 1605 waiver is strictly construed, and there must be strong
evidence that the foreign state intended to waive its immunity. See Rodriguez v. Tran-
snave, 8 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1993). A foreign state impliedly waives its immunity when
it agrees to arbitration in another country, agrees that a contract is controlled by the laws
of another country, or files a responsive pleading without raising immunity as a defense.
None apply in this situation. See id. A property owner suing for damages resulting from a
Treaty inspection could not rely on a section 1605(a)(1) waiver to obtain jurisdiction over
the offending foreign state. See id.
The only other relevant exception to the general immunity of a foreign state is provided
by section 1605(a)(5). A foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction in a United States
court when money damages are sought for “damage to or loss of property, occurring in the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994). The damage must have occurred as a result
of a tortious act or omission of either the foreign state or an offical or employee of that
state within the scope of that person’s office or employment. See id. However, tortious acts
and omissions committed within the tortfeasor’s discretionary function as an official or
employee are immune from jurisdiction. See id. § 1605(a)(5)(A). Any foreign state inspec-
tor performs pursuant to the terms of the Treaty and, therefore, performs a discretionary
function. Thus, the inspector is immune from jurisdiction. See Johnson v. Fankell, 117
S.Ct. 1800, 1803 (1997) (recognizing the discretion exception for qualified immunity for
state officials); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (noting that discretionary
actions receive immunity if not violative of clearly established statutes or constitutional
rights).
375. See Kellman et al., supra note 113, at 109.
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foreign, or domestic, court is remote; thus, such suits are inappropri-
ate remedies.
Nor could a plaintiff successfully bring suit against Treaty offi-
cials in the OPCW, which includes members of the inspection team.
The Treaty provides complete immunity for all OPCW personnel for
acts conducted in their official capacity.376 This immunity also in-
cludes protection from criminal and civil suits as enjoyed by inter-
national diplomats under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.377
The Treaty language authorizes the director-general to waive any
member of the inspection team’s immunity “in those cases when the
director-general is of the opinion that immunity would impede the
course of justice and . . . can be waived without prejudice to the im-
plementation of the provisions of this Convention. Waiver must al-
ways be express.”378
It seems unlikely that the director-general would waive a Treaty
official’s immunity unless a Host State Party member can demon-
strate that the official intentionally abused his or her privileges and
immunities. Even if immunity were waived by the director-general,
it would be nearly impossible to hail a Treaty official from a foreign
nation into a United States court without creating an international
incident. As such, monetary damages actions against Treaty officials
are an inappropriate remedy to correct a violation of a United States
citizen’s constitutional rights.379
Further, while the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)380 permits
private parties to sue the federal government for the negligent acts
of its employees,381 there are several exceptions that may prevent a
private plaintiff from recovery against this entity.382 First, an inten-
tional negligence exception exempts the federal government from li-
ability if an employee’s intentional torts were committed in good
faith.383 As a result, private property owners would only be able to
maintain an action against the United States government if the gov-
ernment officials who facilitated the inspection acted maliciously or
                                                                                                                   
376. See TREATY, supra note 21, art. VIII, ¶ 48-51, at 308; id. Annex on Implementa-
tion and Verification, Part II, § B, at 345-47.
377. See id. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part II, ¶ 11(e), at 346; Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, ¶¶ 1-3, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
3240-41, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 112.
378. TREATY, supra note 21, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part II, ¶ 14,
at 347.
379. See Kellman et al., supra note 113, at 109.
380. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994).
381. See id.
382. See id. § 2680.
383. See Kellman et al., supra note 113, at 111.
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in bad faith.384 Second, the government may avoid liability for al-
leged torts committed by federal officials in the performance of a dis-
cretionary function.385 Therefore, with at least two broad-ranging ex-
ceptions by which the United States government may claim sover-
eign immunity from tort actions, property owners are unlikely to re-
cover for the loss of confidential business information and violations
of privacy interests.
Finally, private plaintiffs have little chance of successfully
bringing suit against United States officials in their individual ca-
pacity under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.386 Normally, a Bivens action permits a person to seek
monetary damages against a federal official for alleged violations of
constitutional rights.387 In the case of challenge inspections, a plain-
tiff might allege both a violation of the Fourth Amendment based on
the illegality of the search, and a violation of the Fifth Amendment
based on the unauthorized and uncompensated release of guarded
trade secrets.388 Yet, reliance on a potential plaintiff’s ability to bring
a Bivens suit to redress the constitutional violations perpetrated by
National Authority officials falls short of providing an adequate and
appropriate remedy.389 It is unlikely that an award against a gov-
                                                                                                                   
384. See id. at 112 n.239 (citing Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 397 (4th Cir.
1978).
385. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994). For a discussion of the discretionary function ex-
emption, see Kellman et al., supra note 113, at 111 nn.235-36. Additionally, the FTCA
permits federal immunity from claims alleging governmental interference with contract
rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994). Such an exception might bar recovery for the re-
lease of confidential business information. See Kellman et al., supra note 113, at 112.
386. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (holding that a warrantless search of Biven’s apartment
was a violation of the Fourth Amendment). The Court, however, did not consider the im-
munity question.
387. See id. at 397.
388. See Kellman et al., supra note 113, at 114 n.249 (citing Seguin v. Eide, 720 F.2d
1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that although no case has explicitly awarded damages
under a Bivens action for a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Se-
guin recognized the potential for such a suit)).
389. Gualtieri and Tanzman proposed the creation of a government-administered col-
lective insurance fund so that individual plaintiffs will not have to resort to Bivens actions
or suits against the United States or foreign governments. Under such a proposal, indi-
viduals and businesses potentially effected by verification inspections would pay into this
fund “based on such factors as their market share, the risk of loss posed to each firm, and
the likelihood of a claim being made by that firm.” Id. at 114 nn.252-53.
Such a proposal, even if mandated by Congress, fails to provide an appropriate remedy
to redress constitutional violations. The government-administered collective insurance
fund effectively forces individuals to pay into a fund that would later be used to compen-
sate their own damages. Forcing individuals to pay their own compensatation is hardly an
appropriate remedy to justify banning injunctive relief. Acceptance of the proposed collec-
tive insurance fund would set a precedent whereby the government can violate an indi-
vidual’s constitutional rights without the fear of injunctive proscription. Instead, indi-
viduals will foot the bill to compensate themselves for violations of their own rights. This
could have been prevented if the courts were not stripped of their power to issue injunc-
tive relief. Also, in the case of challenge inspections, the proposal for a collective insurance
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ernment official in his or her personal capacity could fairly remuner-
ate a plaintiff for the loss of confidential trade information or busi-
ness secrets. Even if courts were to recognize such an action, the
government official may still claim qualified immunity as a defense
to avoid liability to a Bivens suit.390
Even if one of the aforementioned suits against foreign or domes-
tic governments or their employees could succeed, wise policy de-
mands that the government not be permitted to buy itself out of con-
stitutional violations. Allowing the government to pay for its consti-
tutional violations instead of allowing the individual to prevent the
constitutional tort in the first place makes a mockery of affirmative
constitutional safeguards.
The fourth amendment does not grant the government the dis-
cretion to decide whether the benefits of infringing the public’s
right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures are
worth some expenditure of the public’s funds; the language of the
amendment is an affirmative command. It is therefore doubtful
that the substitution of a claim against the government . . . would
provide equally effective vindication of the constitutional interests
thus protected, and it is therefore doubtful that such a substitution
would be constitutionally valid.391
3.  The Unconstitutionality of Congress’s Ban of the Only
Appropriate Judicial Remedy
If Congress strips lower court jurisdiction to fashion the sole ap-
propriate remedy, the practical effect of such legislation is to deny
the plaintiff a forum in which to have his or her claims properly ad-
judicated. As Lawrence G. Sager noted: “Hobbling the judiciary by
denying it all reasonably effective remedies is as fatal to a litigant’s
effort to vindicate constitutional rights as is flatly denying the liti-
gant a judicial forum. Indeed, for many constitutional claims the
availability of anticipatory relief is essential.”392
To do otherwise would legitimize Congress’s power to jurisdic-
tionally exclude the prevention and protection of constitutional
rights in individual cases. By eliminating jurisdiction, Congress
would prohibit judicial scrutiny of legislative regulations that ad-
versely impact constitutionally safeguarded liberties.
                                                                                                                   
fund does not assume that any business or residence may be subject to an inspection. This
means that every private individual or business would be forced to buy insurance because
injunctive relief is unavailable.
390. See id. at 114 n.252 (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.6
(1994)).
391. Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1563 (1972).
392. Sager, supra note 368, at 85.
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In the case of challenge inspections, Congress’s attempt to strip
lower court jurisdiction to issue injunctions is nothing more than a
means to elevate the importance of the Treaty above the protection
of Fourth Amendment rights. This “means to an end” rationale for
jurisdictional withdrawal was explicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court over 100 years ago.393 The holdings of such landmark cases as
Marbury v. Madison 394 and United States v. Klein 395 helped forge the
role of the judicial branch in the American political system—to pro-
tect the rights and liberties of United States citizens through the
careful review of legislative acts. It would undermine the function of
the court system if Congress could prohibit judicial remedies for the
constitutional violations for which the courts were created.396 Alex-
ander Hamilton aptly summarized this concern in the Federalist Pa-
pers when he wrote:
Limitations on legislative authority can be preserved in practice
no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose
duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of
the Constitution void. Without this, all reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.397
V.  CONCLUSION
The Treaty is the result of years of international negotiations to
prevent the potential use and proliferation of chemical weapons. The
Treaty calls for a ban on the development, production, and stockpil-
ing of chemical weapons which is enforced through an intensive
verification regime. Given the threat chemical weapons pose to in-
ternational security and the damage their use can have in a domes-
tic setting, such a global agreement seems appropriate.
However, the intrusiveness of the verification mechanism by
which the international community seeks to enforce the Treaty
raises clear constitutional problems. The availability of challenge in-
spections by the verification regime allows other Treaty signatories
to request inspections of any private business or home in the United
States without meeting a minimal evidentiary burden or warrant re-
quirement. The Implementation Act facilitates these challenge in-
                                                                                                                   
393. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146-47 (1872) (standing for the
proposition that when an impermissible substantive end is achieved by prescribing a sub-
stantive rule under the guise of a jurisdictional regulation, Congress’s attempt to with-
draw jurisdiction may an unconstitutional means to an end).
394. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
395. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
396. See Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 506 (1974).
397. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, Alexander Hamilton, at 466 (New Am. Lib.
ed. 1961)).
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spections by establishing a National Authority with the capability to
obtain administrative warrants to authorize these searches.
Objections to the Treaty arise because, like all international
agreements, it is subject to the constitutional limitations imposed on
all statutory regulations in the United States. Specifically, the scope
of the Treaty’s challenge inspections should be bound by the Fourth
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. Unfortunately, there is little hope that a judicially recognized
exception exists to exempt challenge inspections from traditional
warrant and probable cause requirements.
The Implementation Act’s attempt to prevent private businesses
or property owners from indirectly causing the United States to ab-
rogate its treaty obligations is unconstitutional. In effect, the Im-
plementation Act’s jurisdictional prohibition against injunctive relief
destroys the only appropriate remedy available to safeguard an in-
dividual’s Fourth Amendment rights.
While well-intentioned, the practical effect of the Treaty and the
domestic Implementation Act in the United States will be to subju-
gate paramount individual constitutional rights to the hope of ac-
quiring some level of security from the ever-present threat from the
proliferation of chemical weapons.
